Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court by Green, Rebecca
William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 2
Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court
Rebecca Green
William & Mary Law School, rgreen@wm.edu
Copyright c 2010 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Repository Citation
Rebecca Green, Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court, 16 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 237 (2010),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol16/iss2/2
PRIVACY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN COURT
REBECCA HULSE*
INTRODUCTION
I. SITUATING “PRIVACY” IN THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONTEXT
A. The Public-Private Distinction
B. The Problem of “Privacy”
1. Defining Privacy
2. Feminist Legal Thought: Interpreting Privacy
C. Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court
II. PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT PROCEEDINGS AND RECORDS:
GENERAL OVERVIEW
A. The Presumption of Openness
B. Presumption Limited
1. At the Discretion of the Judge
2. At the Discretion of the State Legislature or the Court
3. The Impact of the Internet
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE ACCESS-VERSUS-PRIVACY
TENSION
A. Domestic Violence Cases: Public Access
B. Online Access to Domestic Violence Records
C. Specialized Domestic Violence Courts, Privacy, and Access
1. Overview
2. Specialized Domestic Violence Courts and
Public Access
a. Records
b. Proceedings
IV. THE NEW HORIZON: TECHNOLOGY, ACCESS, AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES
A. The Domestic Violence Court Technology Application and
Resource Link
B. The Global Justice Technical Privacy Framework
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
* Rebecca Hulse teaches seminars in Privacy, Media Law, and Alternative Dispute
Resolution at the William & Mary School of Law where she is Assistant Director for
Privacy and Technology at the Center for Legal and Court Technology. Many thanks to
my able research assistants Amy Rose and Thomas Williams. Thanks also to the many
individuals interviewed for this article who generously shared their time and wisdom.
237
238 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 16:237
INTRODUCTION
The problem of domestic violence has long centered on the
question of what is public and what is private. Historically, this
dichotomy acted to prevent the state from interfering in the home
to address domestic violence.1 In the past several decades, domestic
violence advocates, feminist legal theorists, and others have suc-
ceeded in chipping away at the public-private distinction such that
states began to pass laws and adopt practices to address the prob-
lem.2 The state became so active in addressing domestic violence, in
fact, that many jurisdictions put in place mandatory arrest and no-
drop prosecution policies requiring the state to act against abusers
even in instances in which victims preferred otherwise.3 These
policies led many to question the contours of privacy in the domestic
violence setting. Do mandatory arrest policies and no-drop prosecu-
tions violate victims’ privacy interests? Should a domestic violence
victim have the right to define who comes in and out of her home
and make decisions about domestic violence prosecutions that affect
her family?
A less examined question is the nature of domestic violence
victims’ privacy interests once the matter goes to court. Unlike the
home — the archetypal zone of human privacy — courtrooms and
court records feature the exact opposite presumption: what happens
in court is public. A presumption of open access to both court pro-
ceedings and court records dominates, at least in principle. But the
limited nature of the presumption has always left room at the mar-
gins for debate about when openness should be sacrificed for privacy
and other interests. Particularly with the rise of the Internet and its
shake-up of the traditional privacy-versus-access balance in courts,
the question of what is “public” and what is “private” in court has
become a messy one.
1. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as a Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996) (noting that domestic violence law started from the notion
of “marital prerogative”).
2. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1860-62 (1996) (describing development
of statutes that require arrests and prosecutions in domestic violence cases).
3. Id. at 1862.
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This paper will examine the privacy interests of domestic vio-
lence4 victims5 in court. What are the contours of these interests?
What is the impact of the Internet on privacy and domestic violence
court records? And finally, in what ways, if at all, might technology
help promote privacy interests of domestic violence victims in court?
I. SITUATING “PRIVACY” IN THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONTEXT
The centerpiece of the effort to understand and remedy abuse
in the home began as an effort to understand the boundaries be-
tween public and private. Feminist legal theorists first began to
describe the problem and seek solutions by critiquing the public-
private distinction.6
Concurrently, academic and legal circles, including feminist
legal theorists, started to examine the concept of “privacy” as a social
and legal construct.7 In the process of trying to define exactly what
4. This paper uses the term “domestic violence” to describe violence in the home
between adults largely because most courts adopt this reference when categorizing these
kinds of cases. Statistically speaking, such violence is most typically perpetrated by a
man against a woman. Interesting scholarship has emerged shedding light on other aspects
of family violence including same-sex intimate partner violence, dating violence, and
domestic violence perpetrated by women against men. See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Disabusing
the Definition of Domestic Violence: How Women Batter Men and the Role of the Feminist
State, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 791, 792 (2003) (noting that studies suggest “men and women
commit violence at similar rates”); Nancy E. Murphy, Queer Justice: Equal Protection
For Victims Of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335, 339 (1995) (citation
omitted) (noting that same-sex domestic violence rates are proportionate to heterosexual
domestic violence rates); Amanda J. Schmesser, Note, Real Men May Not Cry, But They
Are Victims of Domestic Violence: Bias in the Application of Domestic Violence Laws, 58
SYRACUSE L. REV. 171, 172 (2007) (noting that “women are just as capable of abusing
men as vice versa”); Kathryn E. Suarez, Comment, Teenage Dating Violence: The Need
for Expanded Awareness and Legislation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 423, 425 (1994) (noting that “the
patterns of abusive behavior in the teenage dating scenario tend to mirror the patterns
of abuse prevalent in marital settings”). As scholars and activists point out, the term
“domestic violence” therefore falls short as an accurate descriptor.
5. The author acknowledges problems associated with using the term “victim” to de-
scribe those who suffer assault in the home. See, e.g., Bonita C. Meyersfeld, Reconceptual-
izing Domestic Violence in International Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 371, 379-80 (2003) (“A
common question is whether the term ‘victim’ or the term ‘survivor’ should be used when
referring to a woman who suffers abuse. A concern is that the word ‘victim’ imposes on
women a pernicious perception of weakness and vulnerability, which perpetuates the
subjugated status inherent within domestic violence. On the other hand, the word
‘survivor’ is problematic in its implied commentary on those women who either kill or
are killed as a result of the abuse. . . . I choose to refer to women in domestic violence
situations as victims and to the process of harm as victimization. In no way is the term
‘victim’ used to suggest inferiority or weakness.”).
6. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM, AND
POLITICAL THEORY 118 (1989).
7. See Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 233-34
(1977) (describing the legal development of the concept of privacy).
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privacy is, it quickly became clear that the answers were muddled,
and that “privacy” meant one thing in one context and a very different
thing in another.8
A. The Public-Private Distinction
The dichotomy between the private and the public is
central to almost two centuries of feminist writing
and political struggle; it is, ultimately, what the
feminist movement is about.9
Philosophers and political theorists have long employed the
public-private distinction to explain social mechanisms.10 A consis-
tent feature of this discourse relegated the “domestic” to the private
realm and the “political,” or alternatively “economic,” to the public
realm.11 A critical aspect of the public-private distinction is that law
regulates the public whereas the private, at least in theory, “should
be free from interference from the state.”12 This dichotomy has had
important implications for women who, until relatively recently, the
vast majority of theorists viewed unquestioningly as inhabitants of
the private sphere.13
8. Id. at 234 (noting that one observer quipped that privacy has an oddly “protean
capacity to be all things to all lawyers”).
9. PATEMAN, supra note 6, at 118.
10. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 325 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (explaining the contours of the public and private
spheres); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 1-2 (Thomas Burger trans., MIT
Press 1989) (discussing the development of the public sphere from the perspective of class
concepts); Hannah Arendt, Public Rights and Private Interests, in SMALL COMFORTS FOR
HARD TIMES: HUMANISTS ON PUBLIC POLICY 103, 104 (Michael Mooney & Florian Stuber
eds., 1977) (“The reckless pursuit of private interests in the public-political sphere is as
ruinous for the public good as the arrogant attempts of governments to regulate the private
interests of the citizens are ruinous for private happiness.”); see also SHIRAZ DOSSA, THE
PUBLIC REALM & THE PUBLIC SELF: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF HANNAH ARENDT 73 (1989)
(“Arendt’s theory formally defines the public realm in opposition to that which is private,
natural, and removed from the common.”).
11. See Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo, Women, Culture and Society: A Theoretical
Overview, in WOMEN, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 42 (Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo & Louise
Lamphere eds., 1974) (noting that American society relegates women to the private,
domestic sphere and men to the public, working world); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and
the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1992) (“The paradigmatic
private sphere contains the realm of domestic and family life, whereas the paradigmatic
public sphere encompasses the realm of politics . . . .”); see also Jeff Weintraub, The
Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT
AND PRACTICE 28-29 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997) (defining the private
sphere as the domestic, and the public sphere as “extrafamilial economic and political”).
12. Lousie Marie Roth, The Right to Privacy is Political: Power, the Boundary Between
Public and Private, and Sexual Harassment, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 45, 49 (1999).
13. See Gavison, supra note 11, at 22 (“In modern, post-industrial societies, women
have remained relegated to the private.”); Raia Prokhovnik, Public and Private Citizenship:
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A critique of the public-private distinction and women’s place in
it form the core of the feminist movement.14 Since its inception, the
movement sought both to challenge the existence of the distinction
itself and, short of that, at least to bring women more fully into the
“public” realm.15 Feminists critiqued women’s relegation to the pri-
vate sphere on a number of levels. First and foremost, feminist theo-
rists argued that the historical inability to participate in the public
sphere denied women full citizenship rights.16 Without access to public
occupations and participation in the electoral process, women were
effectively barred from political discourse about decisions that affected
their lives. Other feminists critiqued the idea that women were in a
private sphere at all, noting that, historically, wealthy white women
may have been confined there, but that less “privileged” women had
been working and interacting outside the home for centuries.17 More
radical feminist scholars argued that the private — family, marriage,
etc. — was the root of gender oppression and must be “smashed” to
free women from the bonds of family.18 The impact of these critiques,
and indeed other social forces at play, succeeded in challenging the
public-private distinction, as evidenced by the successful suffrage
movement and women’s entrance on a large scale into sectors of the
American workforce which had not previously been open to them.19
The domestic violence movement in many ways has pursued
the mirror outcome: to bring the state into the home — the public
into the private.20 The legal history of the state’s refusal to interfere
From Gender Invisibility to Feminist Inclusiveness, 60 FEMINIST REV. 84, 87-88 (1998)
(noting that, historically, the private realm was sustained by women and that the public
realm has been for men).
14. PATEMAN, supra note 6, at 118; see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER,
AND THE FAMILY 124 (1989) (noting that “ ‘the personal is political’ is the central message
of feminist critiques of the public/domestic dichotomy”).
15. Prokhovnik, supra note 13, at 89-91.
16. Id. at 85-86.
17. EVERYDAY REVOLUTIONS: EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WOMEN TRANSFORMING PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE 23-24 (Diane E. Boyd & Marta Kvande eds., 2008); JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER,
AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 88 (1991); LONNAE O’NEAL PARKER,
I’M EVERY WOMAN: REMIXED STORIES OF MARRIAGE, MOTHERHOOD, AND WORK 29 (2005).
18. See, e.g., SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 74-75 (Bantam Books 4th
prtg. 1972) (noting that “women have been oppressed due to their biological functions”
and that the word “family” was used by Romans to denote a social unit in which the male
head ruled over wife, children, and slaves).
19. THE SEX OF CLASS: WOMEN TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LABOR 3 (Dorothy Sue Cobble
ed., 2007); see also CATHERINE GOURLEY, GOOD GIRL WORK: FACTORIES, SWEATSHOPS,
AND HOW WOMEN CHANGED THEIR ROLE IN THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 79 (1999) (noting
for example, that women in the early to mid-1900s were working in factories and attending
union meetings and rallies).
20. See, e.g., JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 41-50 (2009) (arguing that the pendulum has in
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in matters domestic stretches far back, particularly in the area of vio-
lence against women.21 Early laws in England and the United States
codified the right of chastisement: the right of husbands to subject
wives to corporal punishment.22 Later, as the women’s movement suc-
ceeded in bringing about widespread reform in marriage laws, the
right of chastisement lost favor.23 States passed laws making it illegal
to beat one’s wife.24 In the century and a half that followed, however,
courts still refused to pierce the domestic veil, citing not a husband’s
right to beat his wife, but instead the evolving “right to privacy.” 25
As a North Carolina court put it in 1868,
[H]owever great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and even
personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain, they are not com-
parable with the evils which would result from raising the curtain,
and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the
bed chamber. Every household has and must have, a government
of its own, modelled [sic] to suit the temper, disposition and con-
dition of its inmates. Mere ebullitions of passion, impulsive vio-
lence, and temporary pain, affection will soon forget and forgive;
and each member will find excuse for the other in his own frail-
ties. But when trifles are taken hold of by the public, and the
parties are exposed and disgraced, and each endeavors to justify
himself or herself by criminating the other, that which ought to
be forgotten in a day, will be remembered for life.26
“Raising the curtain” was a central mission of the domestic vio-
lence movement that gained momentum in the 1970s and continues
today.27 Efforts to address domestic abuse have been widespread
and sustained, and have been — although uneven and with great dis-
tance yet to go — fruitful.28 Community infrastructures to support
fact swung too far, resulting for example in state-imposed de facto divorce through the
common practice of non-victim-initiated (or supported) criminal protection orders in the
domestic violence context).
21. Siegel, supra note 1, at 2118.
22. Id. at 2123-25.
23. Id. at 2129.
24. See id. at 2129-30 (“By the 1870s, there was no judge or treatise writer in the
United States who recognized a husband’s prerogative to chastise his wife. . . . [T]hree
states even revived corporal punishment for the crime, providing that wife beaters could
be sentenced to the whipping post.”).
25. See id. at 2119 (noting the shift “from a law of marital prerogative to a law of
marital privacy”).
26. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 457 (1868).
27. See JEFFERY FAGAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 6-10 (1996) (discussing the origins of legal intervention
in family violence).
28. Examples of progress include the passage of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) in 1994, which among other things provides significant discretionary grant
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victims of domestic violence are now commonplace.29 Some statistics
reveal improvements.30
The drive to question the boundaries and even the existence of
the public-private distinction gained so much traction that many
jurisdictions implemented mandatory arrests and no-drop prosecu-
tion policies in domestic violence cases.31 Discourse about the public-
private distinction in this area has led to vigorous debate about the
problems associated with such policies. One side is confident that
shining a public light on the private sphere is the very best means to
address abuse.32 Others have questioned whether foisting the public
legal apparatus into the domestic realm represents a violation of
women’s core interests — namely their privacy.33
funding to domestic violence programs, including funding for shelters, judicial training
and program development, advocacy training and development, and so forth. Title IV of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 & 42 U.S.C.); see also GARINNE P.
LANEY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: HISTORY AND
FEDERAL FUNDING (2008), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2005,0802
-crs.pdf (including tabular listing of funds dispersed under the law).
29. See LANEY, supra note 28 (showing figures of funding from the Violence Against
Women Act that allow for community infrastructures to support victims of
domestic violence).
30. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Intimate Partner Violence in the
U.S., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/intimate/table/totipv.cfm (last visited Jan. 20, 2010)
(noting that in 1993, nonfatal intimate partner violence was 5.8 victimizations per 1,000
US residents, but by 2005, the violence rate fell to 2.3 victimizations per 1,000 individuals);
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the United States,
Intimate Homicide, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homicide/intimates.cfm#intimates
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (noting that the number of women killed by intimates was stable
for nearly two decades and that since 1993 the number has declined). Note that the
Department of Justice statistics are controversial. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE & THE CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FULL REPORT
OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
(2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles1/nij/183781.txt (finding the rate of
domestic violence against women to be significantly higher than the Department of
Justice survey). Commentators have attributed the decline to greater access to legal
services for victims, improvements in women’s economic status, and demographic trends,
such as the aging population. Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Explaining the Recent
Decline in Domestic Violence, 21 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 158, 169 (2003). Plausibly, tougher
state action against abusers may be impacting the number of reported incidents if tough
consequences for abusers discourages victims from coming forward.
31. Hanna, supra note 2, at 1860-62; see also ABA, COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARREST POLICIES BY STATE (2007), http://www.abanet.org/domviol/
docs/Domestic_Violence_Arrest_Policies_by_State_11_07.pdf (providing an overview of
domestic violence arrest policies by state).
32. KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 68 (2003).
33. Hanna, supra note 2, at 1870; see KELLY, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that over
seventy percent of the people who do not report incidents of domestic abuse cite privacy
as a primary reason); SUK, supra note 20, at 6-7 (arguing that consequences of increased
state action in the home have lead to “not only the protection of some women but also . . .
substantial reductions in the autonomy of women . . . vis-à-vis the state”).
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At least some of this tension can be attributed to the definitional
problem of privacy.
B. The Problem of “Privacy”
1. Defining Privacy
Legislators, scholars, advocates, and others have tried hard to
pin privacy down.34 How to understand and categorize the different
interests that make up what we call “privacy” has become a sus-
tained effort.35
American privacy law hails its origins in large part to Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The
Right to Privacy.36 In their article, Warren and Brandeis reached out
to find a legal remedy for a wrong not then protected by law. They
called it, “the right ‘to be let alone.’ ” 37 Their call stemmed in large
part from invasive technological innovation: instantaneous photog-
raphy and the rise of yellow journalism regaling the masses with
details of individuals’ private lives.38 Taking Warren and Brandeis’s
arguments to heart, judges began providing tort remedy for claims
of invasions of privacy.39
Seventy years later, William Prosser published his seminal
article, Privacy, in which he categorized four types of privacy torts
judges had recognized in the years since Warren and Brandeis
wrote.40 Prosser’s privacy torts include:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s
name or likeness.41
34. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335,
1340 (describing the many efforts).
35. Id.
36. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 751, 767 (1996) (noting that according to a study completed in 1996, Warren &
Brandeis’s Right to Privacy was the ninth most cited law review article).
37. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890).
38. Id. at 195.
39. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960).
40. Id. at 389.
41. Id.
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Consistent with the harms Warren and Brandeis first identified,
Prosser’s torts each related to protecting individuals’ autonomy in
a way that kept the “private private.” 42
In 1967, amidst the Cold War and social upheavals of the time,
Alan Westin published a categorization of privacy called Privacy
and Freedom.43 Westin’s privacy focused on its nature as a human
requirement and a foundational value in a functioning democracy.44
In Westin’s view, “individual privacy” could be broken down into
four separate categories: personal autonomy, emotional release, self-
evaluation, and limited and protected communication.45 Westin was
interested in understanding how privacy could help us attain person-
hood by fostering values that respected individual autonomy. But as
with Warren and Brandeis’s characterization, the focus on individual
autonomy failed to speak to an entire category of persons, as discussed
below, for whom autonomy was neither a goal nor a reality.
Contemporary privacy scholarship has developed a fuller pic-
ture of the range of interests under the privacy umbrella. In the past
twenty years, such categorizations of privacy have become more sen-
sitive to new, networked realities. For example, in 1998, as the rise
of technology began to implicate privacy in dramatic ways, scholar
Jerry Kang sought to create a categorization that could help tame
splintering understandings of privacy in different contexts.46 Kang
described three overlapping “clusters” of privacy interests — spatial,
decisional, and informational — that further brought into focus a cate-
gorization of interests associated with privacy.47 As its name implies,
“spatial privacy” refers to privacy and physical space like the ability
to keep junk mail out of your mailbox48 or the police out of your living
room.49 Decisional privacy relates to the ability to make decisions with-
out unwanted interference, such as the choice to use birth control50 or
terminate a pregnancy.51 Informational privacy refers to people’s con-
trol over the flow of information about themselves.52 Viewed through
42. Note that this is also the preoccupation in other legal areas that address privacy
issues, such as constitutional search and seizure law.
43. ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (photo. reprint 1970) (1967).
44. Id. at 7-8.
45. Id. at 32.
46. Jerry Kang, Information in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1193 (1998).
47. Id. at 1202-03.
48. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t., 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970).
49. See Kang, supra note 46, at 1202 (describing spatial privacy as, inter alia, “the
extent to which an individual’s territorial solitude is shielded from invasion by unwanted
objects or signals”).
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
52. Kang, supra note 46, at 1203.
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Kang’s clusters, the privacy of domestic violence victims in court comes
into sharper focus. Spatial privacy interests might be addressed by
making physical accommodations to the court space, such as separate
waiting rooms; informational privacy relates to victims’ right to con-
trol information courts collect; and decisional privacy, in the court
context, might be seen in a number of ways ranging from how much
control victims are able to assert about the course of litigation to mak-
ing decisions and controlling the content and use of court records in
their cases.
The categorizations developed by these observers and the many
more who have tried to unpack “privacy” in the modern context
reflect the complicated and evolving nature of the term.53 For their
part, feminist legal scholars who have taken up the question have
encountered just as much complexity.
2. Feminist Legal Thought: Interpreting Privacy
Feminist legal scholarship on privacy reveals a deep divide not
only about what privacy is, but whether it is a good or bad thing. In
many narratives, privacy is the villain54 and, in others, it is the hero.55
Some feminist scholars have argued that privacy operates to
women’s benefit. With echoes of Warren and Brandeis, privacy as a
form of “restricted access” to the self 56 can include, for example, the
ability to “limit and define the nature of one’s involvements with
others.” 57 Through this lens, privacy meets several interests feminist
scholars vaunt. For example, the ability to restrict access to oneself en-
ables “seclusion, solitude . . . , anonymity[,]” and confidentiality — all
53. One of the most prolific scholars on the topic of categorizing privacy interests in
the past few decades is Daniel Solove, who has written several articles defining and sorting
the term. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1-2 (2008) (discussing how
difficult it is to articulate a complete and workable definition of privacy); Daniel J. Solove,
A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 486-89 (2006) (describing “privacy” as a
general umbrella term that often is too broad and can lead to misunderstandings, and
so breaking the term into a taxonomy of four basic groups of harms is more functional);
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1088-89 (2002) (arguing
that before the problems of privacy can be solved a satisfactory conceptualization must
be developed).
54. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974
(1991) (“[W]e also must examine [privacy’s] underside: the dark and violent side of
privacy.”). Note, for example, the title of Elizabeth Schneider’s 1991 Connecticut Law
Review piece. Id. at 973.
55. See Anita Allen, Privacy, in A COMPANION TO FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 456, 456
(Alison M. Jaggar & Iris Marion Young eds., 1998) (reviewing formulations of privacy
and their treatment by feminists).
56. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 32 (1988).
57. Id. at 27.
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important and basic privacy values that serve women’s interests in
a variety of ways.58
Other feminist scholars have rejected the benefits of privacy to
women altogether, noting for example that privacy has often worked
against women’s interests. Most famous, perhaps, is Catherine
MacKinnon’s observation that privacy is the “right of men ‘to be let
alone’ to oppress women one at a time.” 59 As another scholar put it,
home, the archetypal locus of spatial privacy, is “a man’s castle but a
woman’s place.” 60
Feminists also critique the concept of privacy for the “autonomy”
perspective so central to prominent characterizations of the idea noted
above.61 Some argue that the traditional paragon of the private indi-
vidual alone and untouched, wandering unmolested in the woods, is
a model that does not apply to most women’s lives and therefore fails
to represent their interests.62 Scholars like Mary Ann Glendon have
argued that the social world defined by an individualistic value of
privacy is one of neglect, in which social support and community are
missing.63 As John Gilliom expresses it, “[individualistic] privacy
rights language may serve to exclude a significant portion of the
population for whom the idea of the private individual is just silly —
people, many of them women and others who are deeply involved in
family life, caregiving, or other relation involving significant depend-
ency and interdependency.” 64
58. Anita L. Allen, Privacy at Home: The Twofold Problem, in REVISIONING THE
POLITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL
THEORY 193, 207 (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Christine Di Stefano eds., 1996).
59. Catharine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION:
MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 53 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessy eds., 1984).
60. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 56, at 63. Another scholar deserving careful
consideration on the matter of privacy and gender is Jeannie Suk, whose work suggests
that rather than categorizing different types of privacy per se, a useful lens in interpret-
ing privacy is often the perception of the kind of woman at issue. SUK, supra note 20, at
108-25. “The privacy debate operates on one level as a debate about what sort of woman
we have in mind . . . .” Id. at 124. Suk asks, provocatively, “Is Privacy a Woman?” Id.
at106-31.
61. See Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of
Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 760 (1999) (discussing the feminist critique of privacy
and suggesting a reconstruction of the concept).
62. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988) (stating
that “feminist theory of the last decade has been that woman [sic] are ‘essentially
connected,’ not ‘essentially separate,’ from the rest of human life”).
63. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 48 (1991) (“[T]he history of the American version of privacy . . . [pays] extraor-
dinary homage to independence and self-sufficiency, based on an image of the rights-
bearer as a self-determining, unencumbered, individual, a being connected to others only
by choice.”).
64. JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 123-24 (William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 2001). This
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In the domestic violence context, this critique is particularly use-
ful, and may go a long way in explaining why traditional assumptions
about “privacy” become so confused in the domestic violence context.
The complex interconnectedness of domestic violence victims within
their families means that the privacy interests at stake often do not
involve an “autonomy” interest, at least as previously understood.
Another important focus of feminist scholarship on privacy is
decisional privacy. When it is understood as women’s ability to ex-
ercise control over decisions about their lives, it is commonly hailed
as a centerpiece right.65 One need look no further than Griswold v.
Connecticut,66 Roe v. Wade,67 and Eisenstadt v. Baird68 to under-
stand the importance of this kind of privacy to the feminist cause.69
It should be noted that not all scholars have been comfortable with
characterizing decision-making autonomy as a kind of privacy. Some
worry that the concept of decisional privacy encompasses too much,
thereby diluting its utility.70 As Anita Allen explains, “some theorists
have emphatically contended that it is inaccurate and confusing to
view questions of the proper limits of state intervention in freedom
of choice respecting sex, childbearing, and the discharge of familial
obligations as questions about privacy. They maintain that such
‘decisional privacy’ is not privacy at all.” 71
As discussed above, the importance of decisional privacy forms
the basis of criticism of responses to domestic violence that disen-
franchise victims of abuse from making decisions about the course
of arrest and prosecution of their abusers.72 In contrast, others argue
perspective allows retreat from valuable interaction within society; privacy becomes a
source of alienation and neglect. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 56, at 49.
65. Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 456 (2006).
66. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (establishing the right of married couples to
purchase contraceptives).
67. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972) (establishing the right of a woman to decide whether
to terminate a pregnancy).
68. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (establishing the right of unmarried individuals to
purchase contraceptives).
69. See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 258-262 (1986)
(discussing the development of a constitutional right to privacy).
70. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421, 438-39 (1980)
(suggesting that certain conceptions of privacy “may obscure the nature of the legal
decision and draw attention away from important considerations”).
71. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 56, at 32. The distinction becomes important
because, as legal theorists have noted, a denial of liberty is “evaluated against the
Fourteenth Amendment procedural standard that citizens shall not be deprived of
liberty without due process of law, rather than against a putative, substantive standard
of fundamental rights of privacy.” Id.
72. SUK, supra note 20, at 6-7; see, e.g., Jessica Dayton, Essay, The Silencing of a
Woman’s Choice: Mandatory Arrest and No Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic
2010] PRIVACY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN COURT 249
that intimate abuse impairs victims’ ability to make rational decisions
and thus requires the state to make decisions for them.73
Privacy understood as the ability to exercise control over infor-
mation about oneself has held an important place in feminist privacy
critiques. Rape shield laws passed in the 1970s and 1980s provide an
ideal example. Rape shield laws limit rape defendants’ ability to cross-
examine victims about past sexual behavior as a means of discredit-
ing their allegations.74 Controlling the flow of information about one-
self was hailed in this context as a meaningful victory against a crim-
inal justice system that used sexual history information about women
against them inappropriately.75 Laws prohibiting media publication
of the identity of alleged rape victims are another example of privacy
as information control.76 States passed such statutes on the related
theory that rape victims would not come forward if their identities
were revealed in the press when doing so.77
Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 284-86 (2003) (arguing that women should
have the authority to decide whether to prosecute their batterers); Miriam H.
Ruttenberg, Note, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and
Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171, 190 (1994) (asserting
that “no-drop” and mandatory arrest policies remove control from the hands of the victims).
73. Barbara Fedders, Note, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and
the Politics of the Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281,
290 (1997). Note that this plays into the feminist critique that women are vulnerable to
privacy invasion “because they are perceived as inferiors, ancillaries, and safe targets
and that women’s privacy is sometimes probed by others who implicitly assume that
daughters, pregnant women, mothers, and wives are more accountable for their private
conduct than their male counterparts.” Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2000) [hereinafter Allen, Cyberspace] (citation omitted).
74. Richard I. Haddad, Note, Shield or Sieve? People v. Bryant and the Rape Shield
Law in High-Profile Cases, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 185, 189 (2005). Note that some
states are softening rape shield laws. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Org. for Women,
NOW Alarmed by Court’s Weakening of Colorado’s Rape Shield Law (Mar. 25, 2004) http://
www.now.org/press/03-04/03-25.html/ (discussing the judge’s decision to allow defense
lawyers to question NBA basketball player Kobe Bryant’s accuser in closed session about
her sexual history despite Colorado’s rape shield law). Sadly, an unfortunate testament
to the impact of human error in the court records privacy world, the court, by mistake,
emailed to members of the press the transcript of the in camera review that the Colorado
statute required to review the sexual history of the alleged victim. See People v. Bryant, 94
P.3d 624, 626 (Colo. 2004) (explaining that though the publication ban was a prior re-
straint, the state’s interest in protecting the victim’s privacy outweighed the First Amend-
ment right of the press to publish information lawfully, though mistakenly, obtained).
75. See Haddad, supra note 73, at 189 (discussing the legal reform movement that
led to adoption of rape shield laws).
76. Id. at 211; see also Kang, supra note 46, at 1203 (discussing the idea of privacy
as information control).
77. Daniel M. Murdock, Comment, A Compelling State Interest: Constructing a
Statutory Framework for Protecting the Identity of Rape Victims, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1177,
1177-78 (2007). Note, however, that the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down the
constitutionality of state statutes that made it illegal for media outlets to publish the
names of rape victims when the media obtained victims’ names from public records. See
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This brief review of the feminist critique of privacy illuminates
the very complex nature of “privacy” as a descriptor of distinct in-
terests and values. These complexities have important implications
for domestic violence victims in court.
C. Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court78
A principal privacy interest in court is the extent of domestic
violence victims’ ability to exercise control over information courts
use to dispense their cases.79 This information includes data victims
voluntarily provide the court and data the court mandates they sub-
mit. “Court records privacy,” or what information the public (and
abusers) can gather about domestic violence proceedings and records,
is at the core of “privacy” for domestic violence victims in court.
Multiple related concerns grow out of this central interest. When
and under what circumstances should courts grant domestic vio-
lence victims’ motions to seal records? Proceed anonymously? Shield
identifying information?
These questions become considerably more complex with the rise
of online court records. As discussed in greater detail below, the past
decade has witnessed a great struggle in courts over whether and to
what extent records ought to be made available online.80 In court,
victims may already have reduced privacy; they have, after all, come
to a public place. Yet the Internet raises the specter of amplification
of this “publicness.” 81 One domestic violence advocacy organization
characterized this distinction as the difference between being “public”
and being “published.” 82 This risk of amplification and the associated
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (Georgia statute prohibiting the press
from broadcasting the identity of a rape victim unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (Florida statute making
it unlawful to print, publish, or broadcast the name of a victim of a sexual offense violates
the First Amendment).
78. This discussion will focus primarily on state courts, in large part because domestic
violence cases fall most typically within state jurisdiction.
79. The question of ownership or control over information about oneself has spurred
interesting scholarship. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1137-38 (2000) (assessing the idea of giving individuals property
rights in their personal data); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2057 (2004) (arguing that personal data is becoming a commodity
in the United States).
80. See infra Part II.B.3.
81. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119,
120 (2004).
82. SAFETY NET, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, PUBLIC & INTERNET
ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS 4, available at http://projects.ischool.washington.edu/law
symposium/docs/courtrecordsandvictims.pdf. [hereinafter SAFETY NET].
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harms that may result explains at least in part domestic violence ad-
vocates’ 83 insistence that domestic violence records stay offline.84
A further set of privacy interests for domestic violence victims
in court relate to spatial privacy interests at the courthouse. Relevant
issues include whether a court offers separate waiting rooms for
domestic violence victims and whether domestic violence victims are
escorted out of the courthouse safely.85 If courts are seen as unsafe
or if victims risk too much physical safety in seeking justice through
the courts, they may be unwilling to enter the building. Indeed, the
issue goes beyond physical safety. Domestic violence victims who
choose to pursue court remedies risk their abusers using the venue
to embarrass and humiliate them.86 The more public the venue, the
more likely victims may hesitate to use courts.87
83. The term “domestic violence advocate” refers to individuals who work to address
the problem of domestic violence, lobby on behalf of domestic violence victims, and provide
services to those who suffer domestic abuse. Some prefer the term “anti-domestic violence
advocates,” which certainly more accurately describes their position. However, because
the domestic violence community more typically drops the “anti,” this paper will as well.
84. SAFETY NET, supra note 81, at 2. Domestic violence advocates point out that it is
not just domestic violence-related records that threaten victims’ privacy interests. For
victims on the run from abusers, any court interaction that results in personal information
that ends up online can tip an abuser off on her whereabouts. Id. (“For example, if a victim
of domestic violence flees her abuser in Virginia, relocates to Texas, buys property, and
files her land record with a court that posts such records on the Web, her abuser can find
her with a simple, national HTML search.”). These phenomena are referred to as “indirect”
domestic violence cases, and are discussed in detail infra Part III.A-B.
85. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cathleen Monahan, Domestic Violence Liaison
for the Office of the Circuit Court Clerk of Cook County, Illinois, in Williamsburg, Va.
(June 17, 2009) (noting that the Cook County specialized domestic violence court
offers separate waiting rooms and separate elevators to victims) [hereinafter Cook
County Interview].
86. See VOICES OF WOMEN ORG. PROJECT & THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT OF THE URBAN
JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE DENIED: HOW FAMILY COURTS IN NYC ENDANGER BATTERED WOMEN
AND CHILDREN 50 (Tracey Bingham et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.vowbwrc
.org/pdf/justiceDeniedRep.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED] (discussing the negative experi-
ences of victims in domestic violence courts).
87. Cindy Southworth & Sarah Tucker, Technology, Stalking, and Domestic Violence,
76 MISS. L.J. 667, 671 (2007); Kristen M. Driskell, Note, Identity Confidentiality for Women
Fleeing Domestic Violence, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 129, 132 (2009); see also Remsburg
v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003) (describing the case of a woman who
was murdered after her stalker used an information broker to get information about her);
Laura Silverstein, The Double Edged Sword: An Examination of the Global Positioning
System, Enhanced 911, and the Internet and Their Relationships to the Lives of Domestic
Violence Victims and Their Abusers, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 97, 128 (2004-2005) (discussing
the implications of technology for victims of domestic violence). Note that the question
of what information can and cannot be shared, and the particular impact of information
sharing on women in the digital age has sparked much scholarly interest among feminist
legal scholars. See Allen, Cyberspace, supra note 73, at 1178 (asserting that cyberspace
presents particular privacy problems for women); Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves:
Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 634 (2000) (suggesting that
granting property rights in personal data would allow individuals to control their own
information privacy).
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But the possibility of humiliation and embarrassment is a risk
arguably shouldered by many other types of litigants in court.88 What
arguably sets domestic violence victims apart from many other parties
are the very real risks to physical safety raised by the choice to use
courts.89 In the case of domestic violence in court, a central privacy
interest can be characterized as a “privacy-as-safety” interest. The
animating principle behind victims and their advocates’ push to keep
records offline, for example, is to keep abusers from tracking victims
down and hurting them.90 Similarly, those courts that provide separate
waiting rooms for victims and escort them out of court do so to protect
victims’ physical safety and limit physical intimidation by abusers.91
There is some question as to whether safety can be understood as
a privacy interest at all. Often, privacy and safety are values in con-
flict: protecting certain individuals’ privacy risks the safety interests
of others.92 Judith Jarvis Thomson was one of the first philosophers
to identify the privacy-as-safety value as a derivative privacy right.
Thomson identified privacy as a cluster of rights that arise from a
number of other rights including property rights, rights to integrity,
and physical safety of the person.93 To illustrate, Thomson compared
two cases of torture, one in which a man is tortured to divulge a puff
pastry recipe.94 In the other, a man is tortured to reveal “what he does
in the kitchen all alone at midnight.” 95 The first is a violation of the
88. See John C. Hendrickson, Selected Materials on Employment Discrimination Law,
in EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE (38TH ANNUAL) 1083, 1097 (2009) (discussing the risk of
embarrassment that litigants run by bringing various types of claims, particularly in the
employment discrimination context).
89. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 86, at 47-51 (citing dangers posed by long wait
times outside the courthouse, isolated stairwells and lack of knowledge about safe waiting
areas). This report also found that “[forty-three percent] of the interviewees had their con-
fidential address [sic] revealed in court via court papers. . . . [Thus] putting them in danger
or forcing them to move.” Id. at 50; see also Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Domestic Violence Courts:
Reducing Pretrial Domestic Violence, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/courts/domestic
-violence-courts/pretrial-abuse.htm (2009) (“A critical issue in domestic violence cases
is the risk of continued victimization during the pretrial period.”).
90. SAFETY NET, supra note 82, at 1.
91. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 86, at 47.
92. See, e.g., Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the
Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 90 (1996)
(discussing the balance that must be struck with sex offender registries); Sarah G.
Johnston, Comment, The Mental Health Security for America’s Families in Education
Act: Helping Colleges and Universities Balance Students’ Privacy and Personal Safety,
46 DUQ. L. REV. 211, 222 (2008) (“Following the suicidal massacre at Virginia Tech . . .
more people are beginning to question whether our desire to protect student privacy has
gone too far, trumping student safety in the meantime.”).
93. Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 313 (1975).
94. Id. at 308.
95. Id.
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right not to be physically harmed.96 The second can be seen as a pri-
vacy violation.97 But we do not, according to Thomson, have a privacy
right not to be tortured to reveal private information.98 We rather
have a right not to be harmed.99 In this instance, Jarvis notes, “one
is inclined . . . to say that it is because I have [the right not to be
harmed] that I have a right to privacy.”100
At least in part, privacy for domestic violence victims in court
derives from a right not to be physically harmed as a result of their
interaction with the court system. Privacy in this light is a derivative
right of the right to personal safety.101
An obvious critique of placing too much emphasis on the privacy-
as-safety interest is that such a reductionist perspective denies or
diminishes other important privacy interests domestic violence vic-
tims possess.102 Still, isolating the privacy-as-safety interest may help
clarify judges’ reaction to domestic violence victims’ privacy inter-
ests.103 In many cases, judges champion domestic violence victims’
privacy-as-safety rights but may be less moved when other kinds of
privacy concerns are in play.
For example, in Indigo Real Estate Services v. Rousey, a victim of
domestic violence sought to substitute her initials for her full name
on an eviction detainer action that was later dismissed.104 She argued
that her right to privacy should outweigh the public interest in access
to her full name in the records.105 But the privacy interest Ms. Rousey
forwarded was not a privacy-as-safety interest. Her abuser knew
where she lived; an altercation with him at her apartment had led
to the wrongful eviction in the first place.106 Instead, the privacy in-
terest Ms. Rousey forwarded in her motion was “protection against
unjustified disqualification from future housing opportunities.”107
The trial court dismissed this interest on the ground that plenty of
other litigants would like wrongful eviction records out of the court’s
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 312.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Thomson’s work has been criticized for its reductive perspective — essentially
sidelining privacy as merely a derivative right of more “important” rights. See ALLEN,
UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 56, at 41.
102. See id. (noting that one of the criticisms of Thomson’s reductionism is that “it
obscures the distinctive meaning of ‘privacy’ ”).
103. See Thomson, supra note 93, at 313-14 (arguing that breaking privacy rights into
derivative rights may help clarify thinking on that privacy issue).
104. Indigo Real Estate Servs. v. Rousey, 215 P.3d 977, 978 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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computerized record system as well.108 Ms. Rousey had not articulated
a privacy interest that outweighed the strong presumption of access.
Ms. Rousey’s experience illustrates the hesitance of courts to
recognize domestic violence victims’ privacy rights when they do not
amount to a privacy-as-safety interest. The statute at the heart of
Ms. Rousey’s case, Washington’s Victim Protection Act, was meant to
protect victims of domestic violence from losing housing as a result
of an abuser’s actions.109 The practical effect of Ms. Rousey’s dismissed
case being listed in the computerized court record system could in
fact be that she may in the future be denied housing. Yet, assuming
the trial court does not reverse itself on remand, the presumption of
openness was too strong to overcome the non-safety privacy interest
Ms. Rousey forwarded.
Ms. Rousey’s experience is not uncommon. In many cases even
outside the domestic violence context, courts routinely dismiss non-
safety-related privacy interests like embarrassment and humilia-
tion.110 Although this may be lamentable in Ms. Rousey’s case (in
which the privacy interest at stake was clearly more than avoiding
embarrassment), it speaks to the strength of the presumption of open-
ness of court proceedings records, which, as will be discussed below, is
not without important benefits for domestic violence victims in court.
II. PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT PROCEEDINGS AND RECORDS:
GENERAL OVERVIEW
In the court context, the line of what is public and what is private
is arguably quite stark. Either a trial is open or it is closed; either a
record is accessible to the public or it is not. Judges and court admin-
istrators involved in drafting access policies have often viewed the
project with this binary choice as the central template. This duality
has formed the basis of the policy clash between those who argue for
openness to encourage judicial oversight and accountability and those
108. See id. at 981 (noting that the trial court held “[t]here are lots of cases every day
that are filed and either a voluntary nonsuit is taken or a stipulation order is taken. . . .
We don’t get to . . . essentially seal the names of the defendants in all of those cases. . . .
I understand that this has a different effect . . . on the tenant potentially, but I still don’t
think that it’s a basis upon which the Court can seal a file. . . . I just don’t see that under
the rules that this is an appropriate case to seal.). On appeal, the Court of Appeals
remanded the case on the grounds that the trial judge had not properly enunciated the
standards applied, leaving plenty of room for the trial court to again refuse Rousey’s
request, albeit with more explanation as to why. Id.
109. Id. at 978; see WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.580(1) (2009) (providing that “[a] landlord
may not terminate a tenancy, fail to renew a tenancy, or refuse to enter into a rental
agreement based on the tenant’s or applicant’s or a household member’s status as a victim
of domestic violence”).
110. See infra Part II.B.1.
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who advocate for more restricted access due to concerns about, inter
alia, unfair publicity, threats to due process, and privacy.111 Amidst
these tensions, the U.S. court system — both civil and criminal, state
and federal — maintains a presumption of openness: proceedings and
court records should be open to the public, at least in principle.
A. The Presumption of Openness
THAT in all publick [sic] courts of justice for
tryals [sic] of causes, civil or criminal, any person or
persons, inhabitants of the said Province may freely
come into, and attend the said courts, and hear and
be present, at all or any such tryals [sic] as shall be
there had or passed, that justice may not be done
in a corner nor in any covert manner.112
The presumption of openness in court proceedings and records
is codified in the U.S. Constitution, most prominently in the Sixth
Amendment which ensures criminal defendants a public trial.113 This
Sixth Amendment guarantee rests on the premise that greater confi-
dence in the outcome and the system of justice will ensue if members
of the public are allowed access. The Supreme Court characterized
the Sixth Amendment’s protections this way: “[t]he knowledge that
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the
forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of
judicial power.”114
The Supreme Court has also located the presumption of openness
to criminal proceedings in the First Amendment. In Richmond News-
papers v. Virginia, the press sought access to a criminal trial after the
defendant waived his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.115 The
Court was confronted with a simple question: does the public maintain
a right to an open trial when the defendant has waived it?116 Despite
an absence of explicit language in the Constitution guaranteeing the
public access to trials, the Court found that the “right to attend
criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment;
111. Id.
112. Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 184, 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial. . . .”).
114. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
115. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 555-56 (1980).
116. Id. at 558.
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without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exer-
cised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of
the press could be eviscerated.’ ”117
The Court located this constitutional right in the historical evo-
lution of the justice system, noting that since the time of the Norman
Conquest, open access to trials has served a fundamental set of pur-
poses.118 Public trials, the Court explained, “gave assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly . . . discouraged perjury . . . mis-
conduct, [ensured against] decisions based on secret bias or partiality,”
and provided important community healing, catharsis, and closure
after criminal acts.119
The presumption of openness is not limited to the criminal con-
text. While no constitutional proclamation safeguards access to civil
proceedings, the Third Circuit was the first federal court to proclaim
a First Amendment right to attend civil hearings and to “inspect and
copy public records and documents, including judicial records and
documents” in civil trials.120
B. Presumption Limited
1. At the Discretion of the Judge
Despite the lofty pronouncements, in both the criminal and civil
contexts the presumption of openness is carefully qualified.121 Con-
cerns over prejudicial pretrial publicity, the danger of impairing law
enforcement, protecting privacy interests of litigants and third parties
(witnesses, jurors, and so forth), promoting public safety, and mini-
mizing public reluctance to use the courts have all been forwarded as
legitimate counterbalances to the presumption of openness.122 When
117. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1971)); see also Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (extending the right of access to
preliminary proceedings in criminal cases); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464
U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (finding voir dire proceedings must be open to the public unless
“closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored”).
118. See Richmond Newspapers Inc., 448 U.S. at 556 (“[T]he King’s will was that all
evil doers should be punished after their deserts, and that justice should be ministered
indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better accomplishing of this, he prayed the com-
munity of the county by their attendance there to lend him their aid in the establishing
of a happy and certain peace that should be both for the honour of the realm and for their
own welfare.”).
119. Id. at 569-70.
120. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069-70 (3d Cir. 1984).
121. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1977); Publicker
Indus., Inc., 733 F.2d at 1071.
122. See Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So.2d 113, 118 (Fla. 1988)
(finding that court proceedings can be closed in order to, among other reasons, “protect
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such concerns arise, the burden falls to the trial judge to weigh those
concerns against the principles supporting openness.123
It is worthy of note that the presumption is quite strong.124
Judges are not often easily persuaded to seal records or close pro-
ceedings. As one judge put it, “embarrassment, damage to reputation
and the general desire for privacy do not constitute good cause to seal
court records.”125
2. At the Discretion of the State Legislature or the Court
Aside from those instances in which judges are persuaded to seal
records or close proceedings, the presumption of openness is also over-
come in more systematic ways.
Certain kinds of proceedings and court records, particularly those
that feature sensitive personal information, may be inaccessible by
statute or court rule. For example, court records from adoption cases,
mental health cases, juvenile dependency cases, and termination of
parental rights cases are inaccessible to the public at many courts by
statute or court rule.126 In addition to case types, certain specific docu-
ments within case files are typically not available for public review
such as pre-sentence reports, financial disclosure statements in family
law cases, and medical records.127 Increasingly, courts have begun
trade secrets . . . protect a compelling governmental interest [such as] national security . . .
to avoid substantial injury to innocent third parties,” and protect privacy); Cohen v.
Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (Wash. 1975) (excluding the public from a court-
room in order “to prevent overcrowding . . . to prevent disorder, to avoid intimidation of
witnesses and to prevent minors from hearing salacious testimony” is within a court’s
inherent power).
123. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that trial courts must “conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests”).
124. See Kamakana v. City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that “compelling reasons” and not just “good cause” is needed in order to keep judicial
records sealed).
125. Doe v. NYU, 786 N.Y.S.2d 902 (App. Div. 2004); see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at
1179 (noting that embarrassment or incrimination without more does not justify
sealing records).
126. See, e.g., The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(4)(B)(i)
(2006) (prohibiting publication of information related to any specific child protection
case); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (West 2008) (closing juvenile court hearings to the
public); FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2009) (closing hearings and records related to children);
FLA. STAT. § 39.809(4) (2009) (closing parental termination hearings).
127. ALAN CARLSON & MARTHA WADE STEKETEE, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. & THE
JUST. MGMT. INST., PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS: IMPLEMENTING THE CCJ/COSCA
GUIDELINES FINAL PROJECT REPORT 12 (2005), available at http://www.jmijustice.org/
Data/DocumentLibrary/Documents/1141965236.05/JMI%20NCSC%20Public%20Access
%20to%20Court%20Records%20Implementing%20Guidelines%20-%20Final%20Report
%2015OCT05.pdf [hereinafter Public Access 2005].
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to adopt policies that restrict access to certain types of information
contained within court records regardless of case or document type —
Social Security numbers are a good example.128
3. The Impact of the Internet
A final systemic means of curtailing access to court records has
been developed to address recent technological advances that enable
“remote access” to court proceedings and records on the Internet.129
Once upon a time, members of the public had no choice but to trudge
to the courthouse to obtain records from the clerk or observe proceed-
ings.130 Now, those same records and proceedings, in rapidly increas-
ing numbers, are becoming available online.131
Judges, court administrators, scholars, and others have struggled
with this new landscape. The central question is whether court access
policies should be altered in light of new and changing technological
128. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 27302 (West 2008) (requiring truncation of social
security numbers); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.84 (West Supp. 2009) (establishing
confidentiality of social security numbers).
129. Many courts are experimenting with Internet access to proceedings, typically at
the appellate level. Examples of courts currently webcasting include the supreme courts
of Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey North
Dakota, Ohio, Texas and West Virginia. Fl. Supreme Court, Oral Argument Schedule &
Briefs, http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/summaries/index.shtml (last visited
Jan. 20, 2010); N.H. Judicial Branch, Supreme Court WebCast, http://www.courts.nh.gov/
cstream/index.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2010); N.D. Supreme Court, Listen to the Supreme
Court, http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/webcasts.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2010); Supreme
Court of OH., Supreme Court Video, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/videostream/
default.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2010); Radio Television Digital News Assoc., Cameras
in the Court: A State-by-State Guide, http://www.rtnda.org/pages/media_items/cameras
-in-the-court-a-state-by-state-guide55.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2010); St. Mary’s Univ.
Sch. of Law, Supreme Court of Tx. webcasts, http://www.stmarytx.edu/law/index.php
?site=supremeCourtWebcasts (last visited Jan. 20, 2010); State of Miss. Judiciary,
Supreme Court: Oral Argument Webcasts, http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/appellate_courts/
sc/scoralarguments.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010), W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals,
Argument Webcast, http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/webcast.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
Trial courts are also experimenting with webcasting, though examples are few and far
between. The Circuit Court of Wise County, Virginia, for example, has experimented exten-
sively with webstreamed trials. See Kathy Still, Clerk Disputes Broadcast Contention,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 2000, at B3 (stating that the Wise County court
system is one of the few that has the technology to do webcasting).
130. Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and
Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 316 (2004).
131. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Service Center, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (providing online access to federal court documents); see also
The Reporter’s Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Access to Electronic Records: A state-by-
state guide to obtaining government data, http://rcfp.org/elecaccess/elec_access_main.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (providing a list of state-by-state electronic access to records).
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realities.132 Many argue that “public is public” — i.e., if a document
is public, it should be made available online as well.133 Availability
online should not alter its status in any way.134 In fact, the “public
is public” camp argues that giving the public more meaningful and
convenient access through the Web upholds and forwards the values
that underlie the presumption of openness.135 The other side argues
that the increased access to records online signals the need for a
major shift in policy.136 Privacy interests of litigants once protected
by dusty and hard-to-access files (a protection commonly referred to
as “practical obscurity”) are now thrust out there for all to see, requir-
ing new policies to protect litigants’ privacy interests.137 As courts
have wrestled with this issue, inventive strategies have appeared that
move away from a black and white open-or-closed dichotomy. For
example, a whole category of “courthouse only” access has emerged.138
Many courts have determined that certain court records (or informa-
tion within those documents) are, either by courthouse rule, by state
statute, or in rare instances by federal statute,139 inappropriate for
release on the Internet, even though that same document or the in-
formation within it is publicly available at the courthouse.140 Courts
maintaining a “courthouse only” approach will often provide a com-
puter kiosk in the clerk’s office at which the public can search for the
record sought.141
132. See MARTHA WADE STEKETEE & ALAN CARLSON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS &
THE JUSTICE MGMT. INST., DEVELOPING CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC ACCESS TO
COURT RECORDS: A NATIONAL PROJECT TO ASSIST STATE COURTS vi, 1 (2002), available at
http://www.jmijustice.org/Data/DocumentLibrary/Documents/1141964905.77/CCJ-COSCA
%20Access%2018Oct2002FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter Model Policy] (noting that from
May 2001 to June 2002, an advisory panel created by the National Center for State Courts
met to study access to electronic court records and develop model guidelines to be applied
to state court systems).
133. Winn, supra note 130, at 322.
134. Id. at 315, 322.
135. See The Reporter’s Comm. for Freedom of the Press, supra note 131 (providing
arguments why reporters and others need access to court records).
136. Winn, supra note 130, at 315.
137. Id. at 316-17.
138. Alan Carlson, Public Access to Court Records: Reducing the Risk of Disclosure of
Personally Identifiable Information, in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS FUTURE
TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 19, 20 (2007), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/
publications/KIS_Ctfutu_trends07.pdf [hereinafter Public Access Trends].
139. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
140. See Model Policy, supra note 132, at 39-41 (suggesting such an approach in § 4.50);
Public Access Trends, supra note 138, at 20 (discussing a recent study indicated that
twelve out of twenty-two states reviewed employed courthouse-only strategy).
141. See, e.g., CYNTHIA Y. COBBS, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE ILL. COURTS, ELECTRONIC ACCESS
POLICY FOR CIRCUIT COURTS RECORDS OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS 5 (2004), http://www.state
.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Policies/Pdf/PubAccess.pdf (listing items that, while public, 
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III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE ACCESS-VERSUS-PRIVACY
TENSION
Despite progress made in addressing domestic violence issues in
the past several decades,142 domestic violence remains “the leading
cause of injury to women” in the United States.143 “[A]n estimated 1.3
million women are victims of physical assault by an intimate partner
each year” in the United States.144 One study estimated “that [sixty
percent] of orders of protection [are] violated within one year” of issue,
while another found that approximately seventeen percent of domestic
violence victims ultimately murdered by their abusers had obtained
an order of protection prior to their murders.145 Troubling statistics
such as these, along with the passage of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA),146 have helped push law enforcement agencies, advocates,
and courts to experiment with new ways of addressing domestic vio-
lence.147 Much advocacy has centered on the role of law enforcement,
the availability and accessibility of shelters, and access to legal ser-
vices.148 Within the court system, the response to domestic violence
has been spotty, with some jurisdictions devoting significant resources
to develop a sophisticated judicial response including establishing
specialized domestic violence courts,149 while other jurisdictions have
largely maintained the status quo.150
are “excluded from public access in electronic form unless access is provided at the office
of the clerk of court”).
142. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
143. American Inst. on Domestic Violence in the Workplace, Domestic Violence
Statistics, http://www.aidv-usa.com/statistics.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
144. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
14 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/ipvbook-final-feb18.pdf.
145. Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts:
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1292 (2000).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg(b) (providing for “personnel, training, technical assistance, data
collection and other equipment for the more widespread apprehension, prosecution, and
adjudication of persons committing violent crimes against women” (emphasis added)).
147. See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women Home Page, http://
www.ovw.usdoj.gov/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (displaying the DOJ’s myriad
outreach attempts and programs to support VAWA); Proclamation by Barack Obama,
President of the United States, National Domestic Violence Awareness Month 2009 (Oct. 1,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/asset.aspx?AssetId=3103 (“proclaim[ing]
October 2009, as National Domestic Violence Awareness Month”).
148. Farmer & Tiefenthaler, supra note 30, at 158-59.
149. See infra Part III.C.
150. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First
Century: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 359 (2008) (“Family court
judges are often hostile and disbelieving towards claims of domestic violence.”); Matthew
Litsky, Note, Explaining the Legal System’s Inadequate Response to the Abuse of Women,
8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 149, 169-70 (1990) (discussing continuing judicial reluctance
to intervene in family disputes).
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A. Domestic Violence Cases: Public Access
As an initial matter, it is not a simple job to identify a “domestic
violence case.” Domestic violence can be implicated in — or central
to — a variety of civil and criminal cases. Domestic violence can be
part of, for example, divorce or custody cases, criminal and civil pro-
tection order motions, and criminal assault cases.151 But an overly
restrictive view of what kinds of cases implicate the privacy interests
of domestic violence victims in court is problematic. Cases which liti-
gate some aspect of physical assaults on domestic partners (referred
to here as “direct” domestic violence cases) have one set of associ-
ated privacy interests.152 Other “indirect” cases — those in which
domestic violence victims are engaged in the court system for reasons
unrelated to incidents of domestic violence — also present important
privacy challenges.153 With this distinction in mind, this section will
look first at public access in direct domestic violence cases.
Because each state, jurisdiction, and sometimes each court within
a jurisdiction adopts its own rules and procedures for managing direct
domestic violence cases, it can be difficult to draw general conclusions
about how these cases are dispensed and how the access-versus-
privacy issue is weighed. That said, proceedings and records of cases
containing criminal and civil direct domestic violence matters are
public in the vast majority of states.154 The presence of domestic vio-
lence in a case does not necessarily weaken the general presumption
of openness. In fact, the presumption of openness remains strong even
in cases when domestic violence is directly implicated, and especially
in criminal cases where the presumption is at its strongest.155
151. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform, supra note 150, at 354, 359.
152. See, e.g., Model Policy, supra note 132, at 6-7 (addressing the privacy-as-safety
issue faced by domestic violence victims).
153. See, e.g., NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, COMMENTS ON THE MODEL
POLICY GOVERNING ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS 6 (2002), http://www.ncdsv
.org/images/CommentsModelPolicy.pdf [hereinafter Model Policy Comments] (discussing
the danger that domestic violence victims face when land records are available online);
COMM’N ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 10-11 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/publicaccess/
Report_PublicAccess_CourtRecords.pdf [hereinafter New York Report] (explaining that
domestic abusers, batterers and stalkers will often take advantage of any available in-
formation to locate their victims and suggesting that courts “liberally grant requests by
[victims] to protect their identity and location from public disclosure”).
154. See CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, LEGAL GUIDE, http://www.citmedialaw.org/
legal-guide (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
155. See, e.g., Ex parte Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc, 631 S.E.2d 86, 90 (S.C. 2006)
(finding trial court’s reliance on domestic violence concerns did not justify closing hearing).
A notable exception is when the interests of children are implicated. See, e.g., P.B. v.
C.C., 647 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734-35 (1996) (upholding closure of child protective hearing in
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Federal, state, and local statutes and regulations may act to re-
strict access to certain information within records related to domestic
violence, although the record itself may remain public. For example,
in child custody cases, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)156 limits public access to identifying in-
formation within records when a party’s health or a child’s health,
safety, or liberty is threatened.157 Likewise, in divorce cases, some
states maintain specific provisions that allow a party to prevent access
to identifying information within otherwise public records upon a
showing of good cause, which can include concerns related to domestic
violence.158 Domestic violence victims’ ability to redact or otherwise
restrict access to information about them in court records is often not
easily accomplished, as demonstrated in Indigo Park v. Rousey.159
That said, the rise of identity theft has forced courts to be more pro-
tective of personally identifying information in court files, which has
only helped victims of domestic violence interested in protecting their
information from public access, albeit for different reasons (i.e.,
financial safety vs. personal safety).160
Domestic violence victims have numerous means by which to
protect information in otherwise public records by moving to seal rec-
ords, close courtrooms, or redact personally identifying information.
Policies and procedures for doing so vary from court to court. Most
courts take no affirmative action to protect the privacy interests of
litigants, in domestic violence cases or otherwise, relying instead
order to protect best interests of child where the press had “revealed allegations of alcohol
and drug abuse and domestic violence”).
156. U.C.C.J.E.A. (1997), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
uccjea/final1997act.htm. The UCCJEA has been adopted in 48 states and in the District
of Columbia. Massachusetts, Vermont, and Puerto Rico have not adopted the UCCJEA.
Massachusetts and Vermont are weighing adoption. Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif.
State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement
Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp (last
visited Jan. 20, 2010).
157. U.C.C.J.E.A. § 209(e) (1997) (“If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under
oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclo-
sure of identifying information, the information must be sealed and may not be disclosed
to the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made after
a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety, or liberty of the
party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the interest of justice.”).
158. See W. Thomas McGough, Jr., Public Access to Divorce Proceedings: A Media
Lawyer’s Perspective, J. 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 29, 31, 33 (noting that “[a]t least
twenty-four states have open court provisions in their constitutions, many of which have
been cited in admitting the public to divorce proceedings” though they may be closed “for
good cause shown”).
159. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
160. Public Access Trends, supra note 138, at 19.
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on litigants to independently elect to protect their privacy interests
when possible.161
B. Online Access to Domestic Violence Records162
The question of whether and to what extent domestic violence
records should be available online has been hotly contested. In some
instances, the matter has been settled by federal statute. VAWA pro-
hibits the publication on the Internet of identifying information in
protective orders and restraining orders.163 Such information may
still be public (i.e., courts can still provide such information to the
public by other means, for example at the courthouse). VAWA’s re-
striction forbids only Internet amplification. In general, state courts
have proceeded very cautiously when considering which records to
place online.164
161. See, e.g., Arizona Plaintiff’s Guide Sheet for Protective Orders § 11 (2009), available
at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/nav2/selfserv/GuideSheet.pdf (noting that a plaintiff’s
must request that their address be kept private); Colorado Verified Complaint/Motion
for Civil Protective Order § 6 (2009), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/
PDF/jdf402.pdf (allowing requesting party to omit address for safety concerns). In some
states, such as California or Michigan, the courts both require litigants to take a pro-
active approach to concealing their home address and request a public mailing address
in lieu of the litigant’s private home address. California Request for Order (Domestic
Violence Prevention) § 1, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/documents/dv100
.pdf; Michigan Personal Protection Order (Domestic Relationship)§ C, available at http://
courts.michigan.gov/scao/courtforms/personalprotectionorders/cc376.pdf. In Florida, peti-
tioners filing for a civil protective order must file a separate “Request for Confidential
Filing of Address” form for their home address to remain private. Florida Petition
for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence § 1, available at http://www
.flcourts.org/gen_public/family/forms_rules/980a.pdf. A few states, however, such as North
Carolina, do not ask the petitioner for a home or mailing address when applying for a
civil protective order. North Carolina Instructions for Domestic Violence, available at
http://www.nccourts.org/forms/Documents/220.pdf.
162. Note that online access to domestic violence proceedings through webstream or
other method is currently unavailable, to the author’s knowledge, even though many
such proceedings are open to the public. See infra Part III.C.2.b. Although some courts
are experimenting with webstreaming proceedings, they are typically appellate level
proceedings. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. These venues, unlike trial-level
proceedings, are juror- and witness-free and feature relatively less sensitive personal
information than trials tend to dredge up. Courts are unlikely to experiment with web-
streaming domestic violence hearings; indeed, such a move would put victims in danger
and discourage them from using the court system to address abuse. For this reason, the
discussion focuses solely on online domestic violence records.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(d)(3) (2006) (“A State, Indian tribe, or territory shall not make
available publicly on the Internet any information regarding the registration, filing of a
petition for, or issuance of a protection order, restraining order or injunction . . . in either
the issuing or enforcing State, tribal or territorial jurisdiction, if such publication would be
likely to publicly reveal the identity or location of the party protected under such order.”).
164. See Public Access Trends, supra note 138, at 19 (noting reluctance of courts to make
additional information available online). Notable exceptions include the recent Oklahoma
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In 2002, the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) and the
Conference of State Court Administrators (COSCA) published the
Guidelines for Public Access to Court Records (Model Policy).165 The
authors of the Model Policy, relying on a diverse set of recommenda-
tions from a wide variety of commentators, sought to develop a model
to provide courts a blueprint for navigating the evolution from paper
to digital records.166
The advisory committee charged with preparing the Model Policy
recognized that domestic relations records, particularly those involving
child maltreatment and direct domestic violence, required special
attention due to the sensitive nature of the information contained
in these records.167 At a special session of the Second Conference on
Privacy and Public Access to Court Records in 2002,168 participants
developed a list of key questions to examine in domestic relations
court records, that demonstrate how complex privacy interests are
in these cases:
• Should we protect interests of [third] parties involved in
family cases?
• Should court [sic] restrict access to some personal identifiers
in family case records?
fiasco. Court administrators elected to place unredacted public records online and faced
harsh criticism. Oklahoma County Clerk’s Records Reveal Social Security Numbers;
Carolynn Caudill Seeks Redaction Service, THE MCCARVILLE REPORT ONLINE, Mar. 11,
2008, http://wwwtmrcom.blogspot.com/2008/03/oklahoma-county-clerks-records-reveal
.html (quoting an article from The Oklahoman that discussed Oklahoma County Clerk
Carolynn Caudill’s efforts to make all county records available online); see also id. (“Almost
all of some 8.7 million documents — 17 million pages — are online, from mortgage docu-
ments, mineral deeds, liens and other legal ‘papers,’ from original land patents granted
after the Land Run of 1889 to last week’s property deals, said Mark Mishoe, chief deputy
for County Clerk Carolynn Caudill. . . . The conversion cost about $2.5 million — from
a $5 fee assessed since 2000 on most documents filed.”). The effort was halted when news
organizations and bloggers found personally identifiable information of various public
figures within these online records. Id. On March 11, 2008, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
reacted, adopting rules that flatly prohibited access to court records online. Associated
Press, Okla High Court Withdraws Order Restricting Court Records, Mar. 26, 2008,
available at http://www.firstamendment.org/news.aspx?id=19843. A few weeks later, on
March 25, 2008, under fire from access advocates, the Oklahoma Supreme Court withdrew
the order to “give the issue further study and consideration.” Id.
165. Model Policy, supra note 132.
166. Id. at iii, 2.
167. Martha Wade Steketee, CCJ/COSCA Guidelines Project Focuses on Court
Records, FAM. VIOLENCE FORUM (Fall 2003), http://www.ncsconline.org/COPs/FamVio/
FVForumFall2003/CCJCosca.htm.
168. The Conference, sponsored by the Center for Legal & Court Technology (formerly
Courtroom 21) and the National Center for State Courts meets every 18 months. The
Seventh Conference will take place in March 2010. The Center for Legal and Court
Technology, CLCT Privacy Website, http://privacy.legaltechcenter.net/privacy/default.aspx.
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• Should detailed financial information contained in family
case records be accessible to the public?
• Should sensitive reports (e.g., financial and mental health)
in family cases be available to the public?
• How can courts address the special concerns presented in
domestic violence case court documents?
• How are court rules enforced in this arena, especially when
many parties in family and domestic relations court cases
are unrepresented?169
Engaging these important questions, the Model Policy acknowl-
edges the privacy problems publicly available court records present
to domestic violence victims, with a particular nod to the safety in-
terest. For example, the commentary to Section 1.00(a)(5) notes that:
[U]nrestricted access is not always in the public interest. The
interest in personal safety can be served by restricting access to
information that someone could use to injure someone else, physi-
cally, psychologically or economically. Examples of actual injury
to individuals based on information obtained from court records
include: intimidation of, or physical violence towards, victims,
witnesses, or jurors, repeated domestic violence, sexual assault,
stalking, identity theft, and housing or employment discrimi-
nation. While this does not require total restriction of access to
court records, it supports restriction of access to certain infor-
mation that would allow someone to identify and find a person
to whom they intend harm. This is an especially serious problem
in domestic violence cases where the abused person is seeking
protection through the court.170
Acknowledging the safety interests public records jeopardize,
the Model Policy suggests that certain kinds of records remain public
but stay offline.171 In the commentary to Section 4.50 (“Court Records
That Are Only Publicly Accessible At A Court Facility”), the Model
Policy recommends several categories of information that courts
should consider be restricted to courthouse-only access, including:
• Addresses, phone numbers and other contact information for
victims (not including defendants) in domestic violence, stalk-
ing, sexual assault, and civil protection order proceedings; . . .
• Addresses, phone numbers and other contact information
for witnesses (other than law enforcement witnesses) in
criminal, domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, and
civil protection order cases; . . . [and]
169. Steketee, supra note 167.
170. Model Policy Comments, supra note 153, at 6-7.
171. Id. at 39.
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• Family law proceedings including dissolution, child support,
custody, visitation, adoption, domestic violence, and pater-
nity, except final judgments and orders . . . .172
In some cases, the Model Policy recommends that certain infor-
mation not be available for public inspection at all, online or other-
wise. Section 4.60, “Court Records Excluded From Public Access,”
stops short of listing suggested categories.173 The commentary to
Section 4.60, however, notes that many states bar public access to
certain information within records, including the “[n]ame, address,
telephone number, e-mail, or places of employment of a victim, par-
ticularly in a sexual assault case, stalking or domestic violence case
[and the] [n]ame, address or telephone number of witnesses (other
than law enforcement personnel) in criminal or domestic violence
protective order cases.”174
Numerous commentators, including the National Network to End
Domestic Violence (NNEDV), weighed in with comments to the pro-
posed CCJ/COSCA Model Policy.175 A common thread in such com-
mentary centered on concerns over victim safety. For example, in its
submission, the NNEDV acknowledged the public interest and benefit
of online records access, but noted that the interest of domestic vio-
lence victims’ safety often outweighs public access justifications and
should therefore be protected in several ways.176 The NNEDV recom-
mended that the Model Policy be amended to, inter alia:
• exclude documents in civil protection matters and family law
cases from remote access;
• exclude domestic violence victim and witness identities from
public access;
. . .
• allow petitioners to exclude all records from remote access;
. . .
• provide more robust notification of electronic record manage-
ment to litigants and victim communities;
• recommend processes for preventing and remedying failures
to properly exclude information from public access.177
172. Id. at 39-40. Note that this is only a partial list.
173. Id. at 45.
174. Id. at 48. Note that the commentary to Section 4.60 notes that the names and
addresses of children involved in domestic violence cases are also commonly excluded
from the public record. Id. at 49.
175. Model Policy Comments, supra note 153, at 1.
176. Id. at 2.
177. Id.
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In the end, the Model Policy recognized concerns associated with
the vulnerability of domestic violence victims and online records, but
left to the states to decide how to manage the privacy/access balance
with respect to domestic violence records.178
Using the Model Policy as a guide, courts have struggled with the
question of the extent to which records ought to be made available
online, if at all.179 In general, at the state level, online records remain
relatively spare. Those state courts that do put records online typi-
cally do so in a very perfunctory way, for example, posting docket-
level information only (party names, case number, filing types and
filing dates, minute records, hearing dates, and so forth).180 Few juris-
dictions post online copies of filings themselves and other more de-
tailed documents in the court record. When such records are available
online, they often require a subscription and/or fees to access, like
PACER, or are available only to authorized users such as the parties
and their attorneys.181 In this way, courts are able to provide a layer
of protection for records placed online that had, in paper form, relied
on the protection of practical obscurity.182 In many instances, whole
categories of cases are excluded from online access. For example, some
courts keep all family court records offline as a matter of policy.183
178. Model Policy, supra note 132, at 3, 5.
179. See, e.g., New York Report, supra note 153, at 3-4 (discussing the difficulty of bal-
ancing the interests of “broad public access” against “the need to take reasonable steps
to safeguard individual privacy and security” especially given the nature of the Internet).
180. See, e.g., id. at 28 (providing an example of the basic information available elec-
tronically in the New York State Unified Court System).
181. See, e.g., Iowa Courts Online Search, http://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/ESAWeb
App/DefaultFrame (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (allowing access to docket information, and
a list of documents filed, but requiring registration to access information such as exhibits,
judgments, and liens).
182. Many jurisdictions offer subscription-only access to online court records. See, e.g.,
Sedgwick County Courthouse, Records Access, http://www.dc18.org/info/records_access
.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (requiring that users pay a fee to access court records).
For the general public (which includes any non-affiliated member of the public, attorneys,
title companies, background checkers, etc.) the fee is $225 to set up the account, a monthly
access fee of $49, along with a $.05 per screen usage fee. Telephone Interview with a
Subscriber Access Consultant, Sedgwick County Courts, Kansas, in Williamsburg, Va.
(2009). The system averages roughly 50 corporate subscribers at any given time, but
hundreds of “users” (meaning employees of subscribers). Id. Family court records, including
domestic violence records, are not available online, although members of the public can
search those records electronically from a computer kiosk at the court (i.e., “courthouse
only availability). Id.
183. See, e.g., Clark County Courts in Las Vegas, Questions and Answers, http://www
.clarkcountycourts.us/clerk/faq.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (offering online access
to court records, but “[o]nline records are not available for family-related matters”); New
York State Unified Court System, WebCivil Supreme, http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/
webcivil/FCASSearch?param=p (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). Note, however, that New
York family case records are not publicly accessible at the courthouse either. See infra
note 219 and accompanying text.
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Even in jurisdictions that post family court records online, domestic
violence cases are routinely excluded.184 Surprisingly, although it is
quite difficult in general to find domestic violence records online that
contain details beyond basic docket information, it is not entirely
impossible. In Fresno, California, for example, court records can be
searched by docket report (name, case number, filing date, or case
type185). Searching under the name “Smith,” my research assistant
located the domestic violence case of Dana Y. Smith v. Daryl E. Davis
Sr.186 that included a home telephone number for both the petitioner
and the defendant.187
As courts develop online access policies, domestic violence and
privacy advocates have been vocal in advocating that records relating
to direct domestic violence cases be kept offline.188 Those advocating
against posting records online have also consistently voiced concerns
about indirect cases as well, with an eye, as in direct cases, to victim
safety.189 When victims of domestic violence are on the run from their
184. See, e.g., Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, DomainWeb, http://apps
.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb/html/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (providing
access to “General Civil, Probate, and Family Law cases”); State of Connecticut Judicial
Branch, Civil/Family Case Detail Inquiry, http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/GetDocket.asp
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (providing access to Civil and Family cases); Johnson County
Kansas District Court, Document Search, http://www.jococourts.org/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2010) (allowing users to search cases in the following categories: Criminal/Juvenile/Traffic;
Civil; Marriage License; Probate); Dallas County Online Record Search, http://www
.dallascounty.org/applications/english/record-search/rec-search_intro.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2010) (providing access to civil and family case records).
185. Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, Case Information, http://fresno
superiorcourt.org/case_info (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). Note that this includes two case
types for domestic violence (one for cases in which children are involved; the other for those
in which children are not involved). Id.
186. Smith v. Davis, No. 08CEFL02399 (May 14, 2008) (dismissed after hearing by
domestic violence court), http://banweb.co.fresno.ca.us/cprodsnp/ck_public_qry_doct.cp
_dktrpt_frames?backto=P&case_id=08CEFL02399&begin_date=&end_date=.
187. Id. (last visited summer 2009) (copy on file with author). Note that a recent visit
to this website found that Ms. Smith and Mr. Davis’s phone numbers are no longer
listed. Id. (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). Interestingly, my research assistant was only able
to locate telephone numbers in domestic violence cases in which the two parties’ phone
numbers were identical (presumably because the number does not pose a threat to the
victim if she and the alleged batterer both use it). Another interesting feature of the
Fresno online access system, used by many other courts as well, is that it assigns an ID
to each party. Clicking on that ID allows the searcher to see a list of cases in which that
person is involved. Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, Banner CourtConnect,
http://banweb.co.fresno.ca.us/cprodsnp/ck_public_qry_main.cp_main_srch_options (last
visited Jan. 20, 2010).
188. See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text; see also Letter from Marc
Rotenberg, Executive Dir. of Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr., et al., to D.C. Superior Court
(Oct. 19, 2007) available at http://epic.org/privacy/dv/DC_Court_records.pdf (discussing
privacy issues inherent in remote access to court docket information and recommending
safeguards to protect certain types of information).
189. SAFETY NET, supra note 82, at 2.
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abusers and are trying to keep identities secret, inclusion of the
victim’s name in any court record can do damage.190 To use an ex-
ample provided by the NNEDV, “if a victim of domestic violence flees
her abuser in Virginia, relocates to Texas, buys property, and files
her land record with a court that posts such records on the Web, her
abuser can find her with a simple . . . search.”191
C. Specialized Domestic Violence Courts, Privacy, and Access
1. Overview
The past several decades have witnessed a trend towards special-
ized courts, which modify the traditional court system to address the
needs of particularized populations. Drug courts, juvenile courts, and
unified family courts provide a few examples of such experimenta-
tion.192 Specialized domestic violence courts are another illustration
of the effort to modify the structure and goals of the justice system
when confronted with a set of issues for which the typical adversarial
model falls short.193 Specialized domestic violence courts grew from the
sense that the justice system treated victims of domestic violence un-
fairly in systematic and troubling ways,194 and that “fear, economic de-
pendence, and even affection . . . made prosecution of such cases in a
traditional court setting extremely difficult.”195 A unique characteristic
190. Id. (“The mere existence of a victim’s name on a court website could lead a batterer
or stalker to a victim’s new community, if not exact address.”).
191. Id.; see also Silverstein, supra note 87, at 124-28 (discussing the relationship
between online court records and cyberstalking).
192. See JAMES L. NOLAN JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT 40 (2003) (discussing the unique characteristics of drug courts); Barbara A.
Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A
Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469, 473 (1998)
(discussing the court reform that led to unified family courts); Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey
A. Fagan, Community Courts and Community Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1503
(2003) (discussing the movement toward juvenile courts).
193. See Mae C. Quinn, Anna Moscowitz Kross and the Home Term Part: A Second
Look at the Nation’s First Domestic Violence Court, 41 AKRON L. REV. 733, 734-35 (2008)
(discussing the fascinating history of the first dedicated domestic violence court, established
in 1946 by a judge ahead of her time, the Hon. Anna Moscowitz Kross).
194. See Donna Wills, Mandatory Prosecution in Domestic Violence Cases: The Case
for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 177 (1997) (discussing the tendency
of domestic violence victims to be too afraid to assist in prosecuting their abusers). Note
that there has also been resistance to the development of separate models for addressing
domestic violence. Some observers, particularly judges, argue that criminal assaults
should be treated blindly and equally by the justice system. See Leonore M.J. Simon, Do
Criminal Offenders Specialize in Crime Types?, 6 APPLIED & PREVENTATIVE PSYCHOL.
35, 35-36 (1997) (discussing the theory that criminals do not specialize in crimes and
should be treated blindly by the courts).
195. HON. DONALD E. SHELTON, THE CURRENT STATE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007, at 9, http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe
?CISOROOT=/famct&CISOPTR=173 (citing Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial
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of domestic violence courts compared to other types of specialized
courts is that they do not follow the “therapeutic” or “problem solving”
model. Most specialized courts are therapeutic or problem solving
courts because they focus on the rehabilitation of the offender, typi-
cally through specialized supervision and monitoring procedures, re-
habilitative services, treatment offerings, and so forth.196 Domestic
violence courts follow instead a victim-centered model, derived from
the theory that the problem with traditional methods of handling
domestic violence cases is that they are an ineffective and even dan-
gerous means of helping victims:
[The] adversarial legal system . . . focuses on procedural issues
and society’s goals of deterrence, punishment, and retribution at
the expense of the victim’s welfare. The adversarial system may
be better suited to litigating crimes between strangers . . . . How-
ever, it may be less effective when dealing with crimes between
intimate partners where the adversarial approach may exacerbate
the problem and increase the danger to victims.197
Modern domestic violence courts began proliferating in earnest
in the 1990s.198 A 2000 study estimated that more than 300 court sys-
tems operate nationwide with specialized methods specific to domestic
violence cases.199 Specialized domestic violence courts can hear cases
involving an array of domestic violence-related matters such as “crim-
inal misdemeanor and felony assault and battery, child custody, juve-
nile and other family law matters, and civil restraining orders.” 200
As jurisdictions experiment, distinct specialized domestic violence
court models have emerged.201 One model features dedicated domestic
Responses to Domestic Violence: The Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2000)); see also id. at 8 (explaining one of the biggest criticisms of specialized
domestic violence courts is the argument that when judges are part of a larger effort to
monitor and plan programs together with prosecutors, probation officers, victim advocates
and others, their impartiality is threatened).
196. Drug courts provide the perfect example of the therapeutic model. See NOLAN,
supra note 192, at 40 (explaining the current drug court model).
197. Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic Violence Court:
Combat in the Trenches, 37 CT. REV. 28, 33 (2000).
198. SHELTON, supra note 195, at 7.
199. SUSAN KEILITZ ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SPECIALIZATION OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE MANAGEMENT IN THE COURTS: A NATIONAL SURVEY 3 (2000),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/186192.pdf. The Center for Court Innovation,
partnered with several other organizations, is currently conducting a “national portrait
of domestic violence courts” survey. SHELTON, supra note 195, at 3.
200. Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts: Components and Considerations, 2 J.
CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 23, 24 (2000).
201. EMILY SACK, FAMILY VIOLENCE PROT. FUND, CREATING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
COURT: GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES 24-29 (2002), available at http://www.endabuse
.org/programs/healthcare/files/FinalCourt_Guidelines.pdf.
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violence civil protection order dockets, often handled by a single dedi-
cated judge (or set of judges on a rotating basis).202 Some manage
enforcement of orders imposing civil or criminal penalties, depending
on the penalty structure in that jurisdiction.203 A second form is the
criminal model in which the criminal domestic violence cases are sepa-
rated out from other criminal cases and dispensed by one or more
dedicated judges.204 A final model is the specialized domestic violence
court that consolidates related caseloads (e.g., integrated domestic
violence courts, unified family courts, and coordinated courts).205
The most popular, and some argue most effective, model of
domestic violence court combines civil and criminal jurisdiction to
allow for a variety of hearings, from civil protection orders to crim-
inal assault charges.206 Domestic violence courts implementing this
practice are commonly referred to as “integrated domestic violence
courts” because of their ability to bridge the gap between the civil and
criminal systems.207 Some of the most developed domestic violence
courts follow this model, including: “Quincy, Massachusetts; New
York City; Dade County, Florida; the District of Columbia;”208 and
202. Id. at 24. Note that some dedicated civil protection order courts are not exclu-
sively domestic violence courts. For example, the Denver County, Colorado, dedicated civil
protection order court hears all types of protection order cases, including those between
neighbors, etc. Telephone Interview with Clerk of the Denver County Courts, Colorado,
in Williamsburg, Va. (July 23, 2009) [hereinafter Denver Interview July 23].
203. See SACK, supra note 201, at 24 (“This model offers many . . . advantages [including]
increased safety, educated judges, sensitivity to victims, understanding of the dynamics of
abuse, access to advocacy, and more. For several reasons, such a docket may be a good
place to start in developing a domestic violence court. First, much of the domestic violence
caseload consists of petitions for protection orders and violation hearings. Second, since liti-
gants in civil protection order cases frequently appear pro se, these cases especially require
judges and court personnel well versed in domestic violence issues. Finally, the protection
order docket is often the entry point for a great many victims into the judicial system.”).
204. See id. at 25 (“Because domestic violence defendants tend to have repeated and
often escalating cases, when misdemeanor and felony cases are combined, a clearer picture
of these defendants emerges. Compliance follow-up is more likely to happen in a criminal
model because there are the mechanisms to facilitate it, such as probation. This structure
of a domestic violence court, then, offers a strong opportunity to provide effective moni-
toring and demonstrate that the system takes domestic violence crime seriously. On the
disadvantage side, just as a purely civil court cannot address criminal actions that may
be going on, a criminal-only caseload does not address related civil cases that also may
be pending.”).
205. Id. at 26; see also Jennifer Thompson, Comment, Who’s Afraid of Judicial Activism?
Reconceptualizing a Traditional Paradigm in the Context of Specialized Domestic Violence
Court Programs, 56 ME. L. REV. 407, 427 (2004) (discussing courts that have a compre-
hensive approach to domestic violence cases as an improvement on traditional models).
206. Nancy K.D. Lemon, Access to Justice: Can Domestic Violence Courts Better Address
the Needs of Non-English Speaking Victims of Domestic Violence?, 21 BERKLEY J. GENDER
& JUST. 38, 50-51 (2006).
207. Anat Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are They Worth the Trouble
in Massachusetts?, 18 B.U. PUB. INT’L. L.J. 197, 210 (2008).
208. Thompson, supra note 205, at 427. For more information about these courts, see
The Mass. Ct. Sys., Quincy Dist. Ct., http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/
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Vancouver, Washington.209 Combining civil and criminal hearings
gives the victims of domestic violence abuse a “one-stop shop,” which
can smooth the path to filing a complaint and also potentially shorten
the wait for relief.210 In addition, the integrated model allows a single
judge, or group of judges, to oversee multiple related cases, allowing
them to see a fuller picture.211
An important distinguishing characteristic of specialized domestic
violence courts is information sharing.212 Management and operation
of domestic violence courts are rarely limited to the court itself, often
spilling over into other areas of the community. Running a domestic
violence court typically requires cooperation between the courts, law
enforcement, probation officers, rehabilitation centers, and com-
munity programs (such as shelters and advocacy programs).213 The
District of Columbia domestic violence court provides an example.
It maintains a web of services including a centralized intake center
at which counselors assist victims with preliminary matters and a
domestic violence coordination unit in which staff helps victims set
court dates and review prior information on the parties.214 Links be-
tween the court, community organizations, and the community at
large are a common feature of domestic violence courts.215
2. Specialized Domestic Violence Courts and Public Access
The discussion below focuses on two elements of access to
specialized domestic violence courts: access to records and access
to proceedings.
a. Records
Does the public have broad access to records of specialized
domestic violence court cases? In general, the specialized domestic
quincydistrictmain.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010), N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct., http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/criminal/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 20,
2010), Eleventh Jud. Cir. of Fla., About the Court, http://www.jud11.flcourts.org/about
_the_court/judicial_circuit_overview.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2010), Super. Ct. of D.C.,
Domestic Violence Unit, http://www.dccourts.gov/dccourts/superior/dv/index.jsp (last
visited Jan. 20, 2010).
209. Maytal, supra note 207, at 219.
210. Fritzler & Simon, supra note 197, at 37.
211. Maytal, supra note 207, at 219.
212. SACK, supra note 201, at 9-11.
213. Tsai, supra note 145, at 1298.
214. Id. at 1305.
215. See, e.g., id. at 1303 (discussing the Dade County Domestic Violence Court’s
requirement that judges make public appearances to educate the public about domestic
violence issues).
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violence courts surveyed allow open access to their records,216 with
exceptions for certain kinds of records, such as juvenile217 and med-
ical records.218 In the Brooklyn Domestic Violence Court, a member
of the public may review criminal records but not civil family records
(note that New York is one of the few states that denies public access
to all family records).219 None of the domestic violence courts surveyed
permit online access to otherwise public records.220 Some courts, such
as the Cook County, Illinois Domestic Violence Court, do make public
records available digitally at a computer kiosk in the clerk’s office.221
Because of widespread understanding of the need (and, as de-
scribed above, often the statutory or court rule imperative) to keep
personal identifiers out of public records involving domestic violence,
many specialized domestic violence courts and advocacy organiza-
tions are experimenting with redaction techniques.222 For example, in
Pinal County, Arizona, a victim advocacy organization automatically
redacts victims’ personal information.223 At other specialized domestic
violence courts, such as in Denver, Colorado, the District of Columbia,
and Brooklyn, New York, the court takes responsibility for redacting
216. The courts surveyed for this paper were: Pinal County, Arizona, Denver County,
Colorado; Washington, D.C.; Cook County, Illinois; Brooklyn, New York; and the Rhode
Island Family Court. Not all persons were willing to provide their names. Telephone
Interview with Tawnya Kude, Manager of Victim Services for Victim Notification, Pinal
County Superior Court, Arizona, in Williamsburg, Va. (June 16, 2009) [hereinafter Pinal
County Interview]; Telephone Interview with Court Clerk, Denver County Court, Colorado,
in Williamsburg, Va. (June 17, 2009) [hereinafter Denver Interview June 17]; Denver
Interview July 23, supra note 202; Telephone Interview with Denise Benet, Women
Empowered Against Violence, Washington, D.C., in Williamsburg, Va. [hereinafter D.C.
Interview]; Cook County Interview, supra note 85; Telephone Interview with Clerk of the
Integrated Domestic Violence Unit, Brooklyn, New York, in Williamsburg, Va. (June 16,
2009) [hereinafter Brooklyn Interview]; Telephone Interview with Kim Seebeck, Director
of Domestic Violence Services, Rhode Island Family Court, in Williamsburg, Va. (June 17,
2009) [hereinafter Rhode Island Interview].
217. See, e.g., Cook County Interview, supra note 85 (stating that juvenile records
are closed).
218. See, e.g., Brooklyn Interview, supra note 216 (stating that certain records, including
medical records, are not accessible to the public).
219. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 166 (McKinney 2009) (“The records of any proceeding in the
family court shall not be open to indiscriminate public inspection. However, the court in
its discretion in any case may permit the inspection of any papers or records. Any duly
authorized agency, association, society or institution to which a child is committed may
cause an inspection of the record of investigation to be had and may in the discretion of
the court obtain a copy of the whole or part of such record.”). In Brooklyn’s domestic
violence court, the public is also not allowed access to records in which a sex crime is
involved. Brooklyn Interview, supra note 216.
220. See supra note 216.
221. Cook County Interview, supra note 85.
222. Public Access Trends, supra note 138, at 21.
223. Pinal County Interview, supra note 216.
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personal identifiers.224 In yet others, such as Rhode Island and Cook
County, Illinois, victims are responsible for affirmatively redacting
personal identifiers.225
All domestic violence courts surveyed have in place the ability
to file a motion to seal part or all of the record in a given case. In
Denver, for example, victims may file a motion to seal the whole
record, which the judge may grant depending on the circumstances
of the case.226 However, for the majority of domestic violence courts
surveyed, securing an order to seal an entire file can be difficult,
particularly in the case of criminal records.227 The District of Colum-
bia Domestic Violence Court, for example, will typically seal records
only if sexual violence is involved.228
b. Proceedings
Without exception, the domestic violence courts surveyed allow
public access to proceedings.229 This may seem counterintuitive. One
might expect that victim-centered domestic violence courts would
take steps to protect the privacy of domestic violence victims. That
open proceedings are the norm speaks to the complex nature of
privacy interests in this context: sometimes, privacy is the enemy.230
224. Denver Interview June 17, supra note 216; D.C. Interview, supra note 216;
Brooklyn Interview, supra note 216.
225. Cook County Interview, supra note 85; Rhode Island Interview, supra note 216.
Note that holding litigants and their attorneys responsible for redaction is the most
common redaction technique that courts currently use, since requiring court clerks to
redact personal identifiers is inefficient and prohibitively expensive. Public Access Trends,
supra note 138, at 21.
226. Denver Interview June 17, supra note 216.
227. See supra note 216 (the exceptions are Denver and Cook County).
228. D.C. Interview, supra note 216.
229. See supra note 216. The domestic violence courts surveyed reported that public
attendance is sparse. The clerk at Pinal County reported that in about one of ten proceed-
ings in its domestic violence court, a family member of one of the parties attends. Pinal
County Interview, supra note 216. Likewise, the District of Columbia court reported that
the general public rarely attends, noting that on occasion a family member or member
of a domestic violence-related non-profit organization will attend. D.C. Interview, supra
note 216. Most courts reported virtually no attendance by members of the media to pro-
ceedings at their courts. See supra note 216 (the exception is Cook County). That said,
some specialized domestic violence hearings are packed to the brink, not by members of
the public there to observe, but by litigants awaiting hearings. New York City domestic
violence courts often hear a hundred domestic violence cases a day, five days a week.
Telephone Interview with Liberty Aldrich, Dir. of Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and
Family Court Programs at the Center for Court Innovation, in Williamsburg, Va. (July 9,
2009) [hereinafter Aldrich Interview]. The average court date in the Syracuse, New York
domestic violence court will include seventy-five cases on the docket. Id. These heavy
dockets translate to packed courtrooms, assuring that at least some of the public oversight
function that open access enables is present.
230. See Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra note 54, at 974 (discussing the
negative side of privacy).
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An ideal means of illustrating the point is an organization called
“Women at the Court House” or “WATCH.”231 WATCH operates in
twenty-nine states (with programs at multiple courthouses in sev-
eral states) plus the District of Columbia.232 The idea behind WATCH
programs is simple, and derives from the very same impulses that
led to the presumption of openness in the first place. With its slo-
gan, “bringing a public eye to justice,” WATCH works to monitor the
justice system’s response to domestic violence233 by sitting in court
and watching.234
Some WATCH volunteers self-identify by wearing bright badges
or holding brightly-colored clipboards (most WATCH programs want
judges, attorneys, defendants, and victims to know they are there);
others appear anonymously.235 WATCH volunteers describe starting
WATCH programs in their area after witnessing a void. Laura
Williams, the Board Chair and Program Director of CourtWatch
Florida, noted that when she, a vocal anti-domestic violence advo-
cate, gave lectures at local domestic violence shelters, women would
frequently approach her afterwards with complaints about the court
system.236 These complaints prompted Williams to establish a WATCH
program in her jurisdiction.237 CourtWatch Florida has between
twenty and twenty-five active volunteers in any given month watch-
ing, conservatively, twenty to thirty hearings per week.238 Some pro-
grams are smaller; for example, a WATCH program in Colorado
231. See Kimberly Wilmont Voss, Court Watchers Changing Courthouse Rules, Women’s
eNEWS, Aug. 22, 2003, http://www.womensnews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/1496 (noting
that, since its inception, many men have joined the effort).
232. See National Court WATCH Programs and Projects, http://www.ncdsv.org/images/
NationalListofCourtWatchProgramsUPDATEDMARCH08.pdf (updated March 2008)
(listing WATCH programs in the United States and abroad including three in Canada
and one in Bulgaria).
233. WATCH, Court Monitoring, http://www.watchmn.org/court-monitoring (last visited
Jan. 20, 2010). Note that some WATCH programs also observe other kinds of hearings
besides domestic violence such as child abuse and sexual assault. Voss, supra note 231.
234. WATCH, supra note 233.
235. A Colorado “WATCHer” explained that she does not identify herself with a badge
or clipboard because she is part of a larger advocacy organization that helps victims of
domestic violence. Telephone Interview with Representative of Chaffee County, Colorado’s
WATCH program, in Williamsburg, Va. (June 30, 2009) [hereinafter Chaffee County
Interview]. She explained that her WATCH program, therefore, is sensitive to whether
the victim feels comfortable with a connection to the organization being known, particularly
to the defendant. Id. This same WATCHer noted that although she does not self-identify
as being affiliated with WATCH, the county is small enough that the judges, prosecutors,
and others with regular business before the court know her association with WATCH. Id.
236. Telephone Interview with Laura Williams, Board Chair, CourtWatch Florida, in
Williamsburg, Va. (June 30, 2009) [hereinafter Williams Interview].
237. Id.
238. Id. (recollection of the author).
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reports that one staff person watches an average of five to six domestic
violence proceedings a week.239
WATCH organizers and volunteers report wide receptiveness to
their efforts within courts. None interviewed reported being asked
to leave during proceedings.240 In fact, several noted that probation
officers, police, attorneys, and advocacy organizations will often call
WATCH volunteers to request their presence when they believe a
problem may be imminent in court, or might otherwise be helpful
towards ensuring that justice is done.241
While WATCH programs report strict adherence to a policy of
non-interference during the observed proceedings,242 one of the most
fascinating aspects of WATCH programs is what they do with the in-
formation collected during observation. As one might suspect, many
WATCH organizations compile statistics and reports that can be very
useful in assessing domestic violence court outcomes.243 But many
WATCH organizations also take a more direct approach to address-
ing problems they observe. Several WATCH organizations contacted
describe a process by which WATCH programs send letters to judges,
attorneys, and sometimes the media communicating their observa-
tions.244 If an attorney has done something particularly well, WATCH
programs might send a “kudos letter” both to the judge or attorney
and, where applicable, his or her boss.245 One volunteer described an
attorney who posted such letters on his wall as a badge of honor.246
When a judge or attorney fails to adequately discharge their duty in
the eyes of the WATCH volunteers, the WATCH program may send
a letter to that person and his or her superior alerting them to the
239. Telephone Interview with Mandy Trollip, Representative of Chaffee County,
Colorado’s WATCH program, in Williamsburg, Va. [hereinafter Trollip Interview] (recol-
lection of the author).
240. WATCH programs in Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, and Montana were interviewed
for this article. Trollip Interview, supra note 239; Williams Interview, supra note 236;
Telephone Interview with Sarah Coulter, Court Monitoring Coordinator, in Minn. (2009)
[hereinafter Coulter Interview], Telephone Interview with Jill Martinez, Executive Dir.,
YMCA, in Mont. (2009) [hereinafter Martinez Interview].
241. See supra note 240.
242. Trollip Interview, supra note 239; Coulter Interview, supra note 240. But see
Williams Interview, supra note 236 (describing one instance of speaking to a prosecutor
at recess during one proceeding about his repeated use of the word “wife beater” to refer
to a man’s undershirt).
243. See, e.g., WATCH, supra note 233 (listing accomplishments of the Minnesota
WATCH program, including “a review of domestic strangulation cases following passage
of new legislation in 2005”).
244. Williams Interview, supra note 236; Coulter Interview, supra note 240.
245. Williams Interview, supra note 236.
246. Id.
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problem and suggesting changes in attitude or behavior.247 In Florida,
for example, WATCH volunteers identified a particular judge who pre-
sided over protective order hearings who was unprofessional, rude,
and disrespectful towards women petitioners.248 WATCH put together
a spreadsheet of the judge’s cases and behavior, sent information to
the judge’s superiors.249 Within two months of delivering this infor-
mation, the judge stopped presiding over protection order cases.250
In particularly egregious instances, WATCH will tip the media.251
In a recent case in Orange County, Florida, WATCH volunteers tipped
the press about a judge they believed gave undue leniency to a fire-
fighter for stalking his ex-wife.252 In that case, the judge reminisced
about his own days as a firefighter while the jury deliberated.253 When
the jury returned with a guilty verdict, the judge, “to the astonishment
of people in the courtroom, completely wiped the jury’s guilty verdict
off his record. He didn’t want the [defendant] to lose his job.” 254 A
segment featuring the incident aired on the nightly news to the
great displeasure of the judge, to be sure.255 The example demon-
strates the principles of oversight and accountability that undergird
the presumption of openness and demonstrate the importance of
open hearings in this context.
Some WATCH programs adopt a less direct approach. The
Colorado WATCH program, for example, does not publish findings
or reports.256 WATCH observations instead become part of the client
file.257 However, if volunteers encounter mistreatment, incidents will
be presented at a bi-monthly meeting of the local domestic violence
coalition, leaving further action up to the District Attorney.258
247. See sources cited supra note 244; see also MONTANA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, COURT WATCH TRAINING MANUAL 58-59 (2007), http://www
.mcadsv.com/documents/CourtwatchTrainingManual10.15.07.pdf [hereinafter MCADSV
Manual] (making suggestions for “Compiling Results & Providing Feedback”).
248. Williams Interview, supra note 236.
249. Id.
250. Id. (noting that WATCH volunteers described receiving dirty looks on occasion
from the recipients of such letters, but the WATCH organizations interviewed reported
no serious repercussions from such action).
251. MCADSV Manual, supra note 247, at 58.
252. E-mail from Laura Williams, Board Chair, CourtWatchFlorida, to William & Mary
Journal of Women and the Law (Jan. 31, 2010, 22:07 EST) (on file with author); see also
Judge Under Fire for Going Easy on Firefighter Who Stalked Ex-Wife, WFTV.com, Feb. 7,
2008, http://www.wftv.com/news/15247420/detail.html [hereinafter Judge Under Fire].
253. Judge Under Fire, supra note 252.
254. Id.
255. See id. (stating that the judge refused to talk to reporters about the incident).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id. (stating that the community domestic violence coalition operating in Chaffee
County includes the district attorney, sheriff’s department, local police, the probation
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WATCH programs provide a perfect example of how privacy
interests in the domestic violence court context are complex. The
knee-jerk reaction when seeking to protect the privacy interests of
domestic violence victims in court might be to close courtrooms.
Certainly this has been the response with respect to other categories
of cases, particularly in areas like juvenile justice in which the well-
being of litigants is of primary concern.259 WATCH, however, demon-
strates the positive impact of openness and why too much privacy
can often work against effective dispensation of these cases.260
But openness has its limits. When asked whether WATCH vol-
unteers would support webcasted domestic violence hearings, the re-
sponses were uniformly negative.261 Although one can see oversight
benefits to webcasting domestic violence hearings (webcasting hear-
ings has the potential to allow for far greater oversight),262 the down-
sides to online amplification of open access are multiple.263 In the end,
the degree of openness must be calibrated to the privacy and safety
interests of parties in court.
IV. THE NEW HORIZON: TECHNOLOGY, ACCESS, AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES
Courts have begun to move beyond the initial shock of digital
technology to look at ways in which it can help manage the access/
privacy balance. The discussion below features two examples of ways
in which courts are experimenting with technology to improve the
administration of domestic violence matters.
department, the victims’ advocate from the sheriff’s department, members of the Alliance
Against Domestic Violence, and representatives from the perpetrators’ treatment providers,
and meets once every other month).
259. See Jennifer Flint, Comment, Who Should Hold the Key? An Analysis of Access
and Confidentiality in Juvenile Dependency Courts, 28 J. JUV. L. 45, 51-52 (2007) (recog-
nizing the welfare of the child as a reason to close a public hearing).
260. Note that even in the area of juvenile justice, the value of open records and
proceedings is starting to be recognized. See, e.g., William McHenry Horne, Note, The
Movement to Open Juvenile Courts: Realizing the Significance of Public Discourse in
First Amendment Analysis, 39 IND. L. REV. 659, 676 (2006) (noting that closed courtrooms
allow “juvenile issues to fall from the public’s radar”).
261. See supra note 240 (recollection of the author).
262. For example, in 2006, Texas set up webcams along the Mexican border as part
of a pilot program to harness the energies of Internet users to fight illegal immigration.
In the month that the pilot program ran, the webcast received just under 28 million hits.
Users emailed approximately 13,000 tips about suspicious activity observed on the site.
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 209 (2008).
263. Concerns would include victim safety, victims’ willingness to use the court system,
the possibility that webcasts could be manipulated to the detriment of victims; and so forth.
See supra Part II.B.
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A. The Domestic Violence Court Technology Application and
Resource Link
As noted above, a unique characteristic of specialized domestic
violence courts is the information sharing infrastructure.264 From a
victim safety perspective, accurate and up-to-date information, par-
ticularly in the context of civil protection order enforcement, can be
critical.265 Many communities undertake careful coordination between
courts, law enforcement, probation officers, rehabilitation centers,
and community domestic violence services such as battered women’s
shelters, batterers’ intervention programs, and advocacy groups.266 At
the Quincy, Massachusetts program, for example, the police operate
a tracking system that alerts the District Attorney’s Office the moment
a domestic violence incident is reported, allowing more time for the
District Attorney and victim advocates to contact and guide the vic-
tim.267 The District of Columbia domestic violence court operates a
domestic violence coordination unit, in which employees help set up
court dates while checking for prior information on the parties.268
Another example is in New York, where a domestic violence court in
Brooklyn has experimented with technology that links courts to the
other relevant agencies and organizations in order to ensure that all
information is current and accurate.269
New York was an early leader in developing information shar-
ing platforms in the domestic violence context. In 2000, the New
York State Unified Court System developed the Domestic Violence
Court Technology Application and Resource Link (hereinafter, the
“Application”) for the Brooklyn Felony Domestic Violence Court.270
264. See supra notes 212-215 and accompanying text.
265. To this end, the National Crime Information Center operates a database that
currently contains protection order data from about two-thirds of U.S. states. Interview
with Denise Dancy, Court Research Assoc., Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, in Williamsburg,
Va. (July 9, 2009). The database is an attempt to provide accurate and updated protection
order information across state boundaries used principally to facilitate law enforcement
response to incidents of domestic violence. Id. The National Center for State Courts is
working with other state and federal agencies to develop a standardized protection order
form to facilitate information sharing across states called Project Passport. Nat’l Ctr. for
State Courts, Project Descriptions, http://www.ncsconline.org/D_research/descriptions.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010); see also Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Extending Project Passport,
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_research/Passport/Revised_Passport_Project_Desciption
_7_051.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (discussing an extension of the project).
266. Tsai, supra note 145, at 1298.
267. Id. at 1299-1300.
268. Id. at 1305.
269. Id. at 1301-02.
270. The Brooklyn Felony Domestic Violence Court was established in 1996. PAMELA
YOUNG, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, AN INFORMED RESPONSE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
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The Application was intended to provide an early model for domestic
violence courts across the country.271 It was designed to enable three
perceived advantages technology could offer: help judges “to make
[more] informed decisions, enhance[ ] the accountability of offenders,
and [improve] collaboration with court partners” such as police, proba-
tion, victim service agencies, and batterers’ intervention programs.272
As one report noted,
Without accurate and immediate information, it was difficult
for the system to address victim concerns and ensure that cases
were handled swiftly. Planners believed that technology could both
improve the efficiency of case processing and increase the speed
and comprehensiveness of communication. “We wanted to see how
a technology application could help fulfill the domestic violence
court model’s principles of victim safety, defendant accountability
and swift judicial response.” 273
The Application featured several fascinating capabilities. First,
planners recognized that sensitive information within the Application
should be seen by some but not others amidst the domestic violence
community necessitating different levels of access to the database.274
Judges, for example, needed broad access whereas an employee of
a batterers’ intervention program’s access would ideally be circum-
scribed.275 The Application was therefore structured such that different
users have different levels of access.276 Users can also have varying
ability to interact with the Application (e.g., some can edit, add and
delete content; others can read only).277
A second concern was security of the system.278 As we are learning
after states began to pass laws requiring notification of data breaches
and the subsequent blizzard of data breach reports, security of in-
formation in databases is often haphazard, a particular concern in
the domestic violence context since a breach can impact the safety of
potentially hundreds of victims.279 The Application therefore features
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION AND RESOURCE LINK 1 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/Informed%20Response1.pdf.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 3.
273. Id. (quoting New York Chief Judge Judith Kaye).
274. Id. at 4.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See id. at 3 (“Given the safety and confidentiality concerns of domestic violence
victims, planners worked closely with victim advocates to develop a secure system.”).
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automatic logout, encryption, and an address-filtering firewall.280 For
accountability and security, the Application also allows administrators
to track access of all logins and changes, “creat[ing] an audit trail of
all activity by specific users.” 281
The Application also has the capability to allow a freer infor-
mation flow between the court and the broader domestic violence
community in real time.282 For example, its features included “victim
advocates report” screens on which victim advocates can “notify the
court immediately of alleged violations of protective orders and pro-
vide other information — with the victim’s consent” pertinent to the
court’s decision-making and enforcement responsibilities.283 “Service
providers, such as batterers’ intervention programs, [can] use the
[A]pplication as a [case] management tool.” 284 Planners designed the
software to allow service providers access to information about only
their clients, further protecting the privacy interests of others popu-
lating the database.285
Finally, the Application features an oversight function. Unlike
court oversight in the past in which policymakers relied on throwing
the doors of courtrooms and file drawers open,286 the Application man-
ages oversight of the court — and indeed the broader system — in
a more controlled (and arguably far more efficient) manner without
compromising the privacy interests of domestic violence victims and
others included in the database. As the 2001 report describing the
Application explains, “researchers are exploring ways to harness infor-
mation from the [A]pplication’s database in order to accurately mea-
sure and monitor the court’s performance.” 287 The software offers the
promise of helping researchers identify domestic violence trends far
more efficiently than traditional oversight mechanisms would have
allowed.288 Because different jurisdictions prosecute domestic violence
cases differently, researchers have been unable to efficiently gather
data on domestic violence. For example, some jurisdictions prose-
cute domestic violence simply as “assault,” meaning a researcher
would have to know the relationship between the assaulter and the
assaultee to know to characterize it as an instance of intimate part-
ner violence.289 The software offers the ability to label data so that
280. Id. at 4.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 3.
283. Id. at 10.
284. Id. at 11.
285. Id.
286. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
287. YOUNG, supra note 270, at 5.
288. Aldrich Interview, supra note 229.
289. Id.
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such information can be more easily extracted, enabling researchers
and others overseeing the system to get a fuller and more accurate
picture in this area.290
The software provides exactly the type of oversight and account-
ability that undergirds the presumption of openness, and does so
with a far more fine-tuned tool than throwing records open to broad
scrutiny. This feature provides a beautiful example of how technology
promises to free policymakers from the blunt tools that have histori-
cally dominated the access versus privacy debate.
The Application is now in use at only one court, the Bronx
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Court.291 Practical and operational
difficulties adapting the Application to the needs of other jurisdictions
led its developers to trim down the initial idea, although the same
basic principles animate subsequent iterations.292 New York State
domestic violence courts now use an application called the “IDV
Application” which is similar to the original Application but scales
back the level of access afforded to “outsiders” (i.e., probation, domestic
violence advocates, batterer intervention programs, and so forth).293
The IDV Application is used by court staff only, principally by judges
and clerks.294 Outside access was reduced in later iterations of the
software not because of privacy concerns or problems with the func-
tioning of the original Application. Rather technical and practical prob-
lems led developers to rein in the parameters of the software, in part
so it would be more transferable in New York courts and beyond.295
B. The Global Justice Technical Privacy Framework
The roadblocks the Application encountered highlight some of the
significant problems associated with automating information sharing
in the justice system. Particularly in state court, different jurisdic-
tions maintain different procedures for different kinds of cases.296 Add
290. YOUNG, supra note 270, at 7.
291. Aldrich Interview, supra note 229.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. YOUNG, supra note 270, at 12. One of the most useful tools that the developers of
the Application identified is the ability to directly upload orders of protection into a state’s
domestic violence registry. Id. Once a judge’s signature on the order is complete, the soft-
ware automatically loads the order into the state registry, resulting in hugely increased
efficiency in law enforcement’s ability to police such orders. Id. See the National Stalker
and Domestic Violence Reduction Act § 40601, 28 U.S.C. § 354 (2006), for the current law
regarding the dissemination of information to courts in domestic violence cases by the
National Crime Information Center.
295. Aldrich Interview, supra note 229. Ms. Aldrich notes that the hope is to update the
IDV Application to include a functionality that allows outsiders to access the system, which
will require greater resources than presently available to accomplish. Id.
296. Id.
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these realities to the variety of access policies courts maintain, and
one can begin to understand how difficult a challenge it is to design
a one-size fits all platform.
Outside the domestic violence context, an enormous effort is
underway to create an automated justice information sharing system
that enhances privacy protections. The U.S. Department of Justice’s
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) is undertaking
a series of justice information sharing initiatives “to provide justice
and public safety communities with timely, accurate, complete, and
accessible information in a secure and trusted environment.” 297
Global’s approach stems from the growing realization among judges,
court administrators, and court technologists that even the most in-
depth training cannot prevent human error.298 As access policies be-
come more and more complicated, they become difficult to enforce.
Computers, at least in theory, can solve this problem.299
One piece of Global’s mandate is focused on conforming court
access policies with a standardized technical structure that “codes”
the policy, meaning that computers, rather than people, read court
access policies and determine who may have access to what data.300
The idea is to promote a standards-based electronic information
exchange in which the code, in the form of metadata, travels with
pieces of information, and access policies are enforced by machines,
not humans.301
The Global working group charged with developing standards
to automate court access policies completed a report in 2007 that lays
out the basic contours of the project. The 2007 report, Implementing
Privacy Policy in Justice Information Sharing: A Technical Frame-
work, notes that “[t]he goal is to identify an approach and framework
for protecting privacy which will be generally applicable to infor-
mation sharing in the justice environment and which can be readily
implemented using existing information technology architectures,
standards, and software tools.” 302
Global’s Technical Privacy Task Team “compiled a set of techni-
cal requirements, specifications, industry standards, guidelines, and
recommendations for applying technology mechanisms to support the
297. GLOBAL SEC. WORKING GROUP TECHNICAL PRIVACY TASK TEAM, IMPLEMENTING
PRIVACY POLICY IN JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING: A TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK iii
(October 31, 2007), available at http://it.ojp.gov/documents/privacy_Report_Final_v_1_0
_10-31-2007_with_cover.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL].
298. Telephone Interview with Tom Clarke, Vice President for Research and Tech. at
the Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, in Williamsburg, Va. (July 20, 2009).
299. See id. (discussing goal to automate the process in order to reduce human error).
300. GLOBAL, supra note 297, at 7-8.
301. Id. at v.
302. Id.
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electronic expression and enforcement of privacy policy.” 303 The tech-
nical requirements developed are called the Privacy Policy Technical
Framework (Framework), which not surprisingly share many charac-
teristics of New York’s Application, only on a broader and more com-
prehensive scale.304 The hope is that each jurisdiction will develop
its privacy policies using the Framework such that the privacy rules
selected by the jurisdiction will be expressed in machine-readable
format along the following parameters:
• Content metadata
P DATA CATEGORIES — Properties of the data, including
data type categories, associations of the data with per-
sons and organizations, data classifications, and data
quality information.
P PURPOSE — The business purposes for which private
data was originally collected.
• Context metadata
P USER CATEGORIES — Properties (attributes) about re-
questors who potentially access private data. These
properties can be used to classify requestors (e.g., role)
and/or used to make dissemination decisions regarding
certain pieces of data.
P CONDITIONS — Expressions that evaluate the context of
a request for data. (e.g., the Subject must be in deten-
tion, and the user category must be Law Enforcement).
P OBLIGATIONS — Additional steps that a requestor is
obligated to take after they receive the information.
P ACTIONS — Type of access (e.g., create, read, update,
delete) to the information by the requestor.
• Decision metadata
P OUTCOMES — Privacy-relevant outcomes to a request
(e.g., disclose, redact, withhold, notify).305
A critical feature of Global’s pursuit is credentialing. Access
policies must restrict access to certain individuals or organizations
to certain kinds of information. As the Framework report explains,
Individuals (or organizations), internal or external to the justice
community, will have identity credentials that can be applied in
determining their rights to access or perform operations on in-
formation covered by a privacy policy. . . . There is currently a
Global Security Working Group initiative to develop guidelines
303. Id. at 1.
304. Id. at v.
305. Id. at 11.
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for expressing user identity credentials in XML [Extensible Mark-
up Language]. This initiative is called Global Federated Identity
and Privilege Management (GFIPM).306
A third feature of the Framework is its audit trail, a mecha-
nism by which court administrators can follow the trail of who has
accessed or tried to access what information,307 according to the
following parameters:
The logged data must be of sufficient detail to identify unautho-
rized attempts to obtain secure information, to support detection
of abnormal usage patterns, and to produce a variety of audit re-
ports verifying conformance to the information service provider
policies. The audit logs become an information asset that must
also be secured by the information service provider.308
The audit trail represents a major innovation technology enables.
Courts have not traditionally logged information about those who re-
quest records. Critics may complain that important access principles
will be compromised if the identities of those accessing records can
be discovered.309 Under traditional principles of open government,
one’s reason for requesting access to court records and the identity
of the requestor is not to be considered when determining whether
access should be granted or not.310 That said, domestic violence advo-
cates have reason to support the audit trail function for at least two
reasons. First, it may deter abusers from using court records for the
wrong reason if their actions can be exposed through an audit. Second,
audit records may provide evidence of harassment that advocates
for victims of domestic violence can use to address it.311
306. Id. at 7.
307. Id. at 8.
308. Id. at 19.
309. See E-mail from Tom Clarke, Vice President for Research and Tech. at the Nat’l
Ctr. For State Courts, to author (July 22, 2009, 21:35 EST) (on file with author) [here-
inafter Clark E-mail July 22] (anticipating steps that will likely be taken to preserve
requester anonymity).
310. Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases provide a perfect example of
the principle that the identity of the requester should not impact access. See, e.g., Nat’l
Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004) (“A person requesting the
information needs no preconceived idea of the uses the data might serve. The information
belongs to citizens to do with as they choose. Furthermore, as we have noted, [access]
does not depend on the identity of the requester. As a general rule, if the information is
subject to disclosure, it belongs to all.”).
311. But audit trails can only go so far. Abusers will inevitably access information pre-
textually or through agents to get around the problem. See, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch,
Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003) (discussing the case of a murder victim whose stalker
obtained her work address by hiring a contractor to place a “pretexting” phone call). In
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Although the Framework offers great promise, there is reason
for pause. Global’s goals are ambitious, requiring seamless interaction
between a large field of diverse players. An analogous effort proved
difficult to pull off in the consumer context. The Platform for Privacy
Preferences (known as “P3P”) was conceived to enable websites to
communicate their privacy practices in a standard format allowing
consumers’ computers, upon encountering the website, to determine
whether the site matches the consumers’ privacy preferences.312 The
idea, similar to the Framework, is to automate the privacy transaction
between the consumer and the website.313 While the idea may have
been a good one in theory, few consumers today are aware of P3P,314
and, because websites are not required to comply with P3P standards
it has been difficult for P3P to take hold in a meaningful way.315
Global will likely avoid some of the hurdles that P3P encoun-
tered.316 The justice system, unlike the wild west of at-large consumer
websites, is a more controlled environment in which data managers
are by and large anxious to set standards and find ways for informa-
tion to flow efficiently.317 Already, the Framework has gained trac-
tion, with numerous vendors and software developers rising to the
challenges laid out in the 2007 report.318 While it remains to be seen
addition, audit trails may not ultimately have the capacity to identify individual users,
only categories of users. Clarke E-mail July 22, supra note 309. For example, responding
to the assumption that the public has a right to anonymous access to court records, courts
may ultimately design audit trails to reveal only that information was accessed by a
member of the public, not which member of the public. Id. According to Tom Clarke of
the National Center for State Courts, “[t]he technical solution that accords with the policy
requirements for anonymous public requests is well understood and implemented in a
number of places.” Id.
312. Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, http://www.w3.org/P3P (last
visited Jan. 20, 2010).
313. Id.
314. Carlos Jensen et al., Privacy Practices of Internet Users: Self-reports Versus
Observed Behavior, 63 INT’L J. OF HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 203, 212 (2005).
315. See Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, supra note 312 (stating that
work was suspended on the project due to lack of support from browser implementers).
316. See Clarke E-mail July 22, supra note 309 (noting that the Framework is more
likely to succeed than previous attempts at automation).
317. See id. (discussing the reasons that this Framework is likely to succeed, citing the
difference between implementation by an authoritative agency as opposed to imple-
mentation with “a semi-proprietary approach”).
318. E-mail from Tom Clarke, Vice President for Research and Tech. at the Nat’l Ctr.
for State Courts, to author (July 29, 2009, 11:49 EST) (on file with author). According to
Mr. Clarke, Global’s efforts are more likely to work than past efforts for several reasons.
Id. First, previous efforts used semi-proprietary approach by a specific vendor; Global’s
approach is indigenous to the judiciary. Id. Second, open standards for major pieces of
the technical architecture had not been written or had not been included in most off-the-
shelf products. Id. Now, increasingly, they are. Id. Third, previous efforts did not design
for a truly federated strategy where it was not assumed that everyone would adopt their
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whether or not the justice community can bring the Framework to
life, the possibility holds great promise for at least three reasons.
First, the Framework offers a digital environment that is far
more secure than a scheme that relies on human enforcement. Once
metadata is attached to pieces of information, it becomes much easier
to control what happens with that information — how it is used, by
whom, and even for how long.319 It also becomes easier to control the
accuracy and integrity of data so held.320 Assuming the Framework
functions as promised, a court’s access policy turns from an aspira-
tional document into code-driven, secure reality (at least in theory).
Second, like the Application discussed above, the Framework also
promises enhanced oversight. When data is tagged, it becomes more
easily manipulable.321 Those interested in using court data for over-
sight purposes (the press, researchers, citizens) will have an easier
time locating and using the information sought. Importantly, tagged
data can easily be anonymized, meaning that oversight need not com-
promise privacy and other interests of litigants and third parties.322
Third, the Framework offers great promise for domestic violence
litigants because it may help overcome the privacy-as-safety dilemma
described above: even if domestic violence courts are careful with vic-
tim records, courts in non-domestic violence cases may not be. Con-
ceivably, courts could mark domestic violence victims’ data with a
“safety risk” tag that would secure personally identifying informa-
tion regardless of whether the person is involved in a domestic vio-
lence case, being sued for eviction, or registering land records. When
metadata can travel with information in court records, the possibil-
ities for controlling and protecting that information downstream are
greatly heightened.
Of course, as with other attempts to secure information, there are
many potential pitfalls. New technologies have always given the
domestic violence advocacy community pause.323 Whether it is GPS on
strategy. Id. The new approach uses open standards that are widely adopted to ensure
interoperability. Id. Fourth, major vendors providing sufficient standards support to
implement the Framework essentially off-the-shelf include all major vendors of security
model products. Id. Fifth, pilots have been implemented in several places now and the
concept is proving out. And finally, the Framework builds systematically on the identity
architecture, which is much more practical for many agencies to implement. Id.
319. See GLOBAL, supra note 297, at 6.
320. See id. at 65 (discussing the Framework’s use of metadata to verify information).
321. See id. at 62-63 (identifying the different ways that tagged data can be used).
322. See id. (discussing the different groupings of metadata types and how they can
be used to protect privacy).
323. Interview with Julie Kunce Field, Executive Dir., Confidentiality Inst., in
Williamsburg, Va. (July 16, 2009). For information on the Confidentiality Institute, see
The Confidentiality Institute, http://confidentialityinstitute.org/Site/Welcome.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2010).
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cell phones or online court records, domestic violence advocates rightly
think through the implications and pitfalls for victims of domestic vio-
lence. Still, online court records have not created the great scourge
that many domestic violence advocates feared.324 Likewise, although
possible shortcomings of the Framework must be thought through
carefully, it holds great promise in addressing the complex privacy
interests of victims of domestic violence who use the courts.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The above analysis reveals several interesting facets of domes-
tic violence victims’ interface with the court system and the problem
of court access and privacy. There is a great deal of consensus that
(1) domestic violence records should not be put online, (2) proceed-
ings and records should remain open to the public, and (3) domestic
violence victims should be granted the means to redact personally
identifiable information, seal records, or close courtrooms as circum-
stances warrant.325 The non-controversial and relatively uniform
access policies at specialized domestic violence courts highlight the
consensus. But the consensus overlooks the privacy problems associ-
ated with indirect domestic violence cases. Courts must begin to take
a wider view of their access policies to take into account the impact
of open records on domestic violence victims. For this subset of liti-
gants, when privacy-as-safety interests are implicated, courts must
rethink their approach to foisting indirect domestic violence records
online when such records include data that identifies and locates
domestic violence victims.
A second general point is that, as we push further into the Age
of the Internet, practical obscurity is practically dead. Courts are
catching on to the vast efficiencies of digital court records. More and
more courts not only require parties to file documents electronically,
but are retroactively digitizing paper records. As these processes be-
come the norm, practical obscurity fades and court records (past and
present) become much simpler to get. Assuming that this trend con-
tinues, parties must be more careful about what they file at court and
courts must become more thoughtful about what information they
require litigants to provide. Lax practices with respect to redaction
324. Id.
325. See supra Part III.C. Note that one major area deserving of review is the extent
to which courts effectively make domestic violence victims aware of means to protect
their privacy. Currently, at many courts, domestic violence victims must affirmatively
redact their information and are not counseled on their ability to do so by court staff. See
supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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and needless inclusion of personal identifiers are already tightening
up as courts and parties become more sophisticated about operating
in a digital records world. As the above discussion of the Framework
demonstrates, courts are increasingly turning to technological fixes
to the death of practical obscurity. Courts and court technologists are
discovering that technology promises far better privacy protections
than dust ever did. It would be naïve to think that a technological fix
is around the corner, but it is appearing on the horizon.
A final important point is that the dichotomy between public and
private in the court records context is a false one. The “privacy” vs.
“access” dichotomy is too stark. Just as feminist legal scholars find
the complex notion of “privacy” at times the foe and at times the hero,
privacy and court access also produces a similarly conflicted picture.
In the case of domestic violence victims and court, it is important to
ensure that victims continue to use the court system without fear for
personal safety. On the other side, however, “privacy” in the form of
closed records and proceedings can be the enemy. Without open access
to domestic violence proceedings and records, needed and valuable
oversight is lost.
Using the technologically sophisticated mechanisms described
above, we can start to picture a world that can better accommodate
the complex picture of privacy in court. Perhaps technology will
provide domestic violence victims and their advocates, researchers,
scholars, law enforcement officers, and the numerous other interested
persons and organizations the tools to oversee and work with the
court system without compromising privacy interests at all. Still, too
much hope should not be pinned on a technological fix. As activist
organizations like Court WATCH so beautifully show, there is no sub-
stitute for the old-school approach: human eyes and ears monitoring
hearings both to laud the system when it works, and address injustice
when it arises.
